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The report presents and compares frameworks and policies relating to refugee resettlement in EU 
Member States. The time-frame of the report is the last decade, i.e. 2003 to 2013. It is based on the 
research conducted for the Know Reset Project and extensively uses the interviews with different 
stakeholders involved in refugee resettlement in the EU, which make valuable contribution to the 
understanding of Member States’ options and policies in the domain of refugee resettlement. 
This report firstly seeks to present and explain the evolution of EU Member States’ commitment in 
resettlement during the last decade by linking it to relevant related initiatives at international 
(UNHCR) and EU levels, most importantly in 2007/2008 and 2011/2012. The report secondly presents 
and compares the content of resettlement-related frameworks and policies in EU Member States, and 
seeks to analyse them in light of common standards and priorities developed by the UNHCR and the 
EU. Last, the report tries to clarify the apparent dichotomy between resettlement and intra-EU 
relocation and the ambiguous relation between the two processes, which may raise priority issues in 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Member States have long been criticised for their low level of participation in the resettlement 
of refugees from countries of first asylum which are unable to provide the adequate protection. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that very few States had a resettlement policy in Europe up until recently 
and even if legal reference to it was almost non-inexistent, a number of European countries have a 
considerable history of having contributed to the reception of refugees and have responded to 
collective protection needs.  
Initially, the resettlement of refugees was essentially used to respond to the collective needs of 
protection due to war or mass persecution. Once created, the UNHCR came to use resettlement as a 
key tool to finding solutions for European refugees after the 2nd World War.2
While Sweden had adopted a resettlement programme as soon as 1950, it was in the late 1970s that 
European countries initiated resettlement programmes. The Netherlands decided to resettle on a 
programme-basis in 1977 and adopted its first quota in 1984. Finland received a number of refugees at 
the request of UNHCR in 1979 and then launched a programme in 1985. Denmark implemented its 
first programme in 1979.  
 During the Cold War, the 
UNHCR turned to resettlement to respond to the many different refugee crises of that era. Several 
European countries participated to the resettlement of Hungarians who had fled to Yugoslavia and 
Austria after the Soviet invasion of 1956. Likewise, European countries reacted similarly to the 
expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972 and to refugee crisis in Chile after the 1973 coup d’état and, 
as a final example, European states also reacted positively to the hundreds of thousands of Indo-
Chinese ‘boat-people’ in the late 1970s. At that time, resettlement was utilised as a t ool in 
safeguarding first asylum in neighbouring countries. 
After the important increase in Vietnamese people leaving their country, the use of large-scale 
resettlement was seen as a p ull-factor for departures and the offer of resettlement places fell 
drastically. It was decided to strenghten the rules for resettlement and the Comprehensive Plan for 
Action signed in 1989 oriented resettlement on individual protection needs.3
From then on, ‘fleeing the Cold War’ would not automatically lead to refugee status and the 
UNHCR took steps in the following years to ‘develop multilateral consultative processes, strengthen 
its resettlement management capacity and articulate resettlement policy and criteria.’ The first 
Resettlement Handbook was released in 1996.
 
4 In 1995, the Working Group on Resettlement (WGR) 
was established to enable the systematic consultation between the UNHCR, resettlement States and 
international organisations like IOM. These partners and invited NGOs then launched the Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) from 1996. It is here that UNHCR’s report on 
Projected Global Resettlement Needs, produced annually, is discussed in detail by the partners5
In the meantime, resettlement was a key tool in the subsequent major refugee crises, such as the 1st 
Gulf War in 1991, the need to transfer inmates in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, followed by the 
war in the former Yugoslavia, and the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Yet, refugee resettlement did not increase 
significantly during the 1990s, and European uptake remained low. Only one new resettlement country 
emerged in the European Union during the 1990s, namely Ireland, which started its first programme in 
 in 
June each year, while the WGR is held in October and March.  
                                                     
2 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.47. 
3 For developments on the history of resettlement, see UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, and Margaret Piper AM, Paul 
Power, Graham Thom, Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, UNHCR Research Paper n°253, February 2013. 
4 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.50 
5 Ibid. p.52 
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1998. Indeed, Ireland responded to the Bosnian crisis of 1992 and to the Kosovan crisis of 1999. Up 
until 2000 it continued to accept relatives of Vietnamese refugees who were initially admitted in 1979 
and relatives of Bosnian refugees admitted between 1992 and 1996. ‘All three of those programmes 
were coming to an end. The UNHCR approached the Department of Foreign Affairs and made the 
case for joining the resettlement quota programme. Decisions were taken in 1998 to bring the Bosnian 
and Vietnamese programmes to an end and to join the annual resettlement quota programme’6
In late 2000, the UNHCR initiated the Global Consultations on International Protection in an 
attempt to revitalise the international refugee regime, bring together Northern and Southern states and 
find some form of convergence between the protection needs of refugees and the interests of states. 
The consultations lasted for two years and resulted in two major outcomes: the 2001 Declaration of 
States Party which reaffirmed UNHCR’s mandate, and the Agenda for Protection which was endorsed 
by the UN General Assembly in 2002. 
. 
The Agenda for Protection called for the expansion of resettlement opportunities due to the extent 
of protracted refugee situations. Together with the Convention Plus Initiative in 2004, the Agenda for 
Protection sought to revive resettlement along a more comprehensive, planned and strategic approach. 
Convention Plus attempted to develop agreements between States to supplement the 1951 G eneva 
Convention and enhance refugee protection at a regional level.  
Yet, revelations of corruption within the UNHCR influenced attitudes towards the management of 
resettlement at this time. As well as this, the terrorist attacks in the United States on the 11th of
 
September 2001 r esulted in resettlement coming to be viewed as b eing a sec urity concern. Public 
perceptions made resettlement from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia more 
“complicated”7
Things started to change in the mid-2000s. One significant factor that influenced changing attitudes 
to resettlement was the fact that there were major changes within the UNHCR
. 
8, such as: The arrival of 
a new High Commissioner, António Guterres, a former Portuguese prime minister who took office in 
2005 and who quickly declared an interest in improving and increasing resettlement; the formation of 
a specialised Resettlement Service and the efforts of senior UNHCR staff who demonstrated a 
capacity to be both more strategic and more effective in the way they dealt with the various 
stakeholders, particularly resettlement States. Supplementing these initiatives was a renewed focus on 
capacity building within the UNHCR, including the revision of the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook.9
The number of EU Member States committed to resettlement has increased significantly over the 
past decade and even more significantly during the past five years.  
 
Five Member States had a resettlement programme before 2003, i.e. Sweden, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Finland, and Ireland. While only one new resettlement country emerged in the EU during 
the 1990s, nine were created during the following decade, seven between 2008 and 2013. The number 
of ‘resettlement countries’ in the EU is now fourteen: in addition to the five countries cited above, the 
United Kingdom launched a programme in 2004, Portugal in 2007, the Czech Republic, Romania and 
France in 2008, Hungary, Belgium, Germany and Spain in 2012/2013. Bulgaria is also about to start a 
programme in 2014. Two additional Member States refer to resettlement in law (Poland and Slovenia), 
even though they have not resettled yet, and two other Member States have already joined resettlement 
operations on an ad hoc basis (Italy, Luxembourg).  
                                                     
6 Interview with Martina Glennon (Assistant Principal Officer) and Elaine Houlihan (Executive Officer), Resettlement Unit, 
Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, 5 January 2012. 
7 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.11 
8 Ibid. p.13 
9 Ibid. 
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Besides, Slovakia hosts an Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) for the humanitarian transfer of 
refugees before their resettlement to EU Member States or third countries, as does Romania. Among 
the six EU Member States which have not taken any steps toward getting involved in resettlement, 
Lithuania began discussions in February 2012 on participating in resettlement.10
The past decade has truly been revolutionary in terms of the initiation of refugee resettlement in 
some shape or form by Member States. For that reason, the time-frame of this report is the period from 
2003-2013 and focusses on the current situation relating to resettlement in the EU.  
 
It is based on the research conducted within the Know Reset project between 2011 and 2013, which 
has provided the following research material: 
− A collection of national data on legal and administrative frameworks, resettlement policies at 
EU and national levels; 
− Statistics collected from the national institutions in the 27 Member States; 
− Interviews conducted with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involved in 
resettlement in the Member States;11
− Comparative analytic tools created for the project; 
 
− Country of first asylum reports based on field research in Kenya, Pakistan and Tunisia. 
In particular, the report utilises the policy positions, opinions and explanations of the different 
stakeholders interviewed in the framework of the project, which allow for an invaluable insight into 
Member States’ law and policy with regard to refugee resettlement.  
This report firstly seeks to present and explain the evolution of EU Member States’ commitment in 
resettlement over the past decade by linking it to relevant related initiatives at international (UNHCR) 
and EU levels. Two turning points have emerged from the observation of this evolution over the past 
decade. In the mid-2000s, the UNHCR was seeking to revive States’ commitment to resettlement, in 
particular through the preparation of ‘group resettlement methodology’ aiming at organising 
Multilateral Resettlement Operations. The possibility of launching a joint resettlement scheme in the 
EU was also considered. The adoption of the European Refugee Fund in 2007 coupled with UNHCR 
and EU’s initiatives around the Iraqi refugee crisis constituted key incentives to expand EU Member 
States’ involvement in refugee resettlement. A few years later, two similar factors – a financial 
incentive at EU level and joint resettlement initiatives – played a similar role in enhancing EU 
Member States commitment in resettlement in a more concerted and sustainable way.  
The report secondly presents and compares the content of resettlement-related frameworks and 
policies in the EU Member States. It seeks to analyse those frameworks and policies in the light of 
common standards and priorities as have been developed by the UNHCR and the EU. This implies 
comparing resettlement in the EU Member States on the basis of a series of criteria, such as the 
following: protection needs when selecting refugees, rule of law and rights granted to resettled 
refugees, responsibility-sharing.  
Finally, the report tries in an additional chapter to clarify the apparent dichotomy between 
resettlement and intra-EU relocation. While it is claimed that the two should be or are unrelated, the 
position of Member States are much more diversified. Some of them consider relocation as a ‘mini-
resettlement’ likely to build their resettlement capacity, both may be merged within the same quota or 
based on the same legal frameworks. The ambiguous relationship between the two processes may raise 
priority problem in refugee protection burden-sharing. 
                                                     
10 UNHCR was informed by the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour about these discussions. Written 
interview of the representative of Regional Office of UNHCR in Lithuania, 23rd of March 2012. Yet, as the representative 
of the Ministry of the Interior was unaware of any on-going discussions on resettlement issue, it follows that it is a very 
initial phase of a possible reform in this field. Written interview of the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, 21st 
February 2012.  
11 Some names are cited in the report, others are not when the interviewees did not wish to be named. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 3
Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames
2. The Development of Resettlement-Related Frameworks and Policies in the EU and its 
Member States  
It was during the second half of the 2000s that EU Member States’ commitment to resettlement 
expanded and strengthened. Formal involvement in resettlement in the EU had two major turning 
points during the past decade. Those turning points are in line with important refugee crises and some 
significant initiatives from the UNHCR and the EU, supported by NGOs which reveal the importance 
of advocacy and joint operations to foster resettlement efforts in Member States.  
Different steps can be distinguished in EU Member States’ commitment. The ‘traditional 
resettlement countries’ resettled on a p rogramme-basis long before adopting legislation which 
provided for refugee resettlement in their Asylum law. During the last decade however, the trend has 
been quite the opposite: States have first expressed their formal commitment to resettlement, through 
the reform of their law and/or the announcement of the adoption of a programme, and the effective 
commitment has then followed – or not. 
2.1 The Turning Points of the Last Decade 
a) From 2003 on  
During the first half of the 2000s, both UNHCR and the EU prepared some tools aimed at developing 
multilateral operations and joint initiatives in the domain of refugee resettlement, which were designed 
to have a clear impact on States’ motivation to be part of collective efforts in the following years. 
The UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection and Multilateral Resettlement Operations 
Convention Plus addressed the issue of resettlement through the Multilateral Framework of 
Understandings on Resettlement, a non-binding agreement between states adopted at the High 
Commissioner’s Forum in 2004. The aim of this agreement was to “strengthen the international 
refugee protection system through a more strategic use of resettlement for the benefit of a greater 
number of refugees” and its purpose was “to guide parties to situation-specific multilateral 
agreements.” It was actually attempting to recreate the “comprehensive plans of action” that had been 
used twenty years before in South East Asia and Central America.12
Refugees may be recognised through individualised determination procedures or, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, through group-determination procedures on a prima facie basis.
 From 2003, the UNHCR started 
to develop a ‘group resettlement methodology’ to enhance resettlement through the use of simpler and 
accelerated processing for groups of refugees while it also advocated for the adoption of flexible 
selection criteria that would go beyond the terms of the 1951 Convention. 
13 This latter 
approach has mainly been adopted in situations of mass influx, ‘where the reasons of flight are 
generally known and the number of arrivals would overwhelm capacities to determine refugee status 
individually.’14
Taking into account the need for responsibility sharing in the protection of refugees and a strategic 
use of resettlement, the UNHCR and its governmental and non-governmental partners have tried to 
undertake multilateral resettlement operations. Resettlement states have therefore been called upon to 
offer places to individuals who belong to specific groups and are in a country of first asylum which 
 
                                                     
12 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.11. 
13 ‘Prima facie (‘in absence of evidence to the contrary’) refers to the process of group determination of refugee status, as 
opposed to individual determination, which is usually conducted in situations where a need to provide urgent assistance 
or other practical difficulties preclude individual determination, and where the circumstances of the flight indicate that 
members of the group could be considered individually as refugees’, UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.20. 
14 Ibid. p.19. 
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does not acknowledge refugee status for instance or cannot provide an adequate level of protection due 
to the number of refugees in need of protection, leading to protracted refugee situations.  
Among the groups of vulnerables persons to be resettled, some refugees appear to be ‘safer’ than 
others and may compensate for caseloads that are deemed to be ‘risky’ on security grounds. In the 
second half of the 2000s, new sources of ‘safe’ refugees emerged. This was the case of Burmese. For 
many years Thailand and to a lesser extent Malaysia had resisted approaches to allow UNHCR to gain 
access to Burmese refugees to process them for resettlement but in the early 2000s, negotiations 
succeeded in convincing them to change their policy.15
Besides, a number of major repatriation operations, especially those to Afghanistan, Iraq and South 
Sudan faced important difficulties which led some resettlement states to resettle refugees from those 
countries, even though they were considered as being ‘risky.’
 
16
The EU’s Initial Steps toward a Joint Resettlement Programme 
 
At the EU level, the Amsterdan Treaty had created a new area of competence for the European Union 
by transferring asylum policy and the Schengen acquis from the intergovernmental pillar to the 
Community pillar. Within the objective of an EU asylum policy, the European Commission suggested 
in its Communication of 22 November 2000 that ‘Processing the request for protection in the region 
of origin and facilitating the arrival of refugees on the territory of the Member States by a resettlement 
scheme are ways of offering rapid access to protection’ (COM 2000/0755 final). The Commission 
believed that only a joint EU approach could create the necessary political and operational terms for 
accessing European territory and for allowing resettlement to be used for strategic purposes - both to 
assist the EU Member States and attain the objectives of the UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection. 
At the time when the United Kingdom was suggesting ‘transit and treatment centres’ in third 
countries in line with its ‘Safe Borders, Safe Haven’ policy, the Commission’s Communication of 3 
June 2003 (COM(2003) 315 final) presented resettlement as a way to provide for ‘managed and 
orderly arrivals of persons in need of international protection.’ This way of presenting resettlement 
was confirmed in June 2004 in a Communication17
In the Hague Programme of 4 and 5 N ovember 2004, the European Council set a series of 
objectives and priorities with a view to further developing the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) in its second phase. In particular, the European Council underlined the need for the EU to 
contribute in a spirit of shared responsibility to a more accessible, equitable and effective international 
protection system and to provide access to protection and durable solutions at the earliest possible 
stage. The European Council went on t o call for the development of EU-Regional Protection 
Programmes (RPP) which included a joint resettlement programme for Member States willing to 
participate in such a programme. The Commission then set out its action plan for one or more 
Regional Protection Programmes.
 in which the Commission proposed an EU-wide 
resettlement scheme.  
18 Those RPP were not shaped as a humanitarian response19
                                                     
15 Ibid. p.11. As a result, whereas only 246 Burmese were resettled in 2002, by 2009 the number had grown to 24,781, a 100 
fold increase15.  
 but as a 
tool to support and build the protection capacity in third countries. Resettlement from the countries 
16 Ibid. p.12 
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 4 June 2004 on the managed entry in 
the EU of persons in need of international protection and the enhancement of the protection capacity of the regions of 
origin: "improving access to durable solutions". COM(2004) 410 final. 
18 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 1 S eptember 2005 on r egional protection 
programmes. COM(2005) 388 final. (Not published in the Official Journal). 
19 Marcin Pruss, European Commission, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
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covered by an RPP was considered as a way to enhance their involvement in refugee protection and as 
a response to the strategic use of resettlement which attempts to influence the behaviour and attitudes 
in countries of first asylum. 
In the meantime, the European Commission also started to fund ‘twinning projects’ aiming at 
developing joint resettlement processes. The MORE Project (Modelling of National Resettlement 
Process and Implementation of Emergency Measures) was an EU funded Project which ran from 
December 2003 to April 2005 and ‘twinned’ a traditional resettlement country, Finland, with a recent 
one, Ireland, in cooperation with UNHCR, IOM and ECRE. The aim of the Project was to develop 
comprehensive models for the resettlement process, which could be utilised by other EU Member 
States and other countries. The main outcome of the Project was the production of a practical guide to 
the resettlement process.  
Impact at National Level 
Before 2003, only five EU Member States had resettlement programmes: the four ‘traditional 
resettlement countries’, i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, and Ireland which 
legislated for resettlement in 1996 a nd started its programme in 1998. T he Czech Republic also 
introduced a reference to refugee resettlement in its Asylum Act in 1999 but only resettled from 2008. 
The following changes occurred during the first half of the 2000s: 
• The UK introduced a specific provision in 2002 in its Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act and started its programme in 2004, ‘to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to supporting 
UNHCR’s global effort to provide durable solutions to the plight of refugees and increasing 
its international contribution to sharing the refugee burden.’20
• Ireland extended its annual quota in 2005 from 10 cases (around 40 persons) to 200 persons 
to be admitted. 
 
• The three Scandinavian ‘traditional resettlement countries’ of the EU decided to formally 
legislate for their commitment by introducing a specific reference to resettlement: Finland in 
2004, Denmark and Sweden in 2005.  
• Germany, which only resettled on an ad hoc basis at that time, changed its law in 2004, to 
allow admission from abroad and issuance of residence permit.  
• Romania, which had never resettled, introduced a specific provision in its law in 2006. 
Article 3(5) of the Asylum law opened the possibility to resettle on a programme-basis. 
In legislating in this way, Romania is representative of a greater trend among the newer Member 
States, those which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The need to revise legislation to conform to the 
EU acquis on asylum was also an opportunity to legislate for resettlement.  
Therefore, by 2007, only one new resettlement country had been created in the EU since the 
beginning of the 2000s, i.e. the UK. Despite this slow progress, the formalisation of a commitment to 
resettle was already on progress.  
 
b) The 2007/2008 Turning Point 
This turning point is due to Multilateral joint operations initiated by both the UNHCR and the EU and 
the adoption of financial incentives for resettlement by the EU. 
 
                                                     
20 Written interview with Dave Atkinson, Home Office, Refugee Team, 16 May 2012. 
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The UNHCR’s Calls for Group Resettlement and Protracted Situations 
The UNHCR pursued its efforts to incentivise and guide States toward situation-specific multilateral 
resettlement operations. The purpose in its doing this was to encourage states to focus attention on 
situations where it was considered that a strategic resettlement operation could leverage benefits for a 
much larger number of refugees, including creating a better protection environment and opening up 
the possibility of local integration.21
In addition to the ‘classical’ multilateral resettlement operations, the UNHCR launched a Special 
Initiative on P rotracted Refugee Situations in 2008 which focused on f ive situations among which 
three had to be resolved through resettlement: 
 
− Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan; 
− Refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh; 
− Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan.22
Besides, at that time, the refugee crisis due to the 2nd Gulf War began to severely impact the 
countries surrounding Iraq, i.e. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In March 2007, the UNHCR declared that 
Iraqis fleeing their country from five central governorates were entitled to prima facie refugee status 
and called for their resettlement. In addition, it established eleven priority resettlement profiles to help 




The ERF and the Iraqi Refugee Crisis  
 in line with the seven globally defined resettlement criteria. 
The European Refugee Fund (ERF) for the period 2008-2013 adopted Decision 573/2007/EC, aimed, 
among other things, to ‘(…) support the voluntary efforts made by Member States to provide 
international protection and a durable solution in their territories to refugees and displaced persons 
identified as eligible for resettlement by the UNHCR, such as the actions that the Member States 
implement to assess the resettlement needs and transfer the persons concerned to their territories, with 
a view to granting them a secure legal status and to promoting their effective integration.”24
Member States could apply for funding to help implement resettlement programmes, and could 
seek 4,000 Euro per resettled person provided the refugee belonged to one of the four vulnerable 
categories eligible, they were:
  
25
• persons from a country or region designated for the implementation of a Regional Protection 
Programme;  
  
• unaccompanied minors;  
• children and women at risk, particularly from psychological, physical or sexual violence or 
exploitation;  
• persons with serious medical needs that can only be addressed through resettlement. 
Beyond this increase in funding, the funding of twinning projects also continued. The MOST 
Project succeeded the MORE Project from 2006 to 2008. The Ministry of Labour in Finland led the 
MOST project and the project partners were the Irish Reception and Integration Agency, the Spanish 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the Swedish Migration Board in cooperation with UNHCR, 
                                                     
21 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.16. 
22 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.59. 
23 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, ICMC, May 2010, p.12. 
24 Recital 18 of Decision 573/2007/EC. 
25 Article 13 of Decision 573/2007/EC. 
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IOM and ECRE. It aimed at exploring ways to improve the resettlement process and focused on the 
quality of integration services. 
In parallel, a Joint EU Call to resettle 10,000 refugees from Iraq was adopted by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council (JHA) on 27-28 November 2008. Help to vulnerable refugees was specifically 
mentioned. The Council Conclusions came about under the French presidency of the EU and under the 
leadership of some Member States that had already been involved in the resettlement of Iraqi refugees 
since 2007.  
Besides, under the Slovenian EU presidency in 2008, EU Ministers from larger resettlement 
countries had signed a declaration where they committed to resettle quantitatively more and prompted 
their colleagues to do the same.26
Impact at National Level 
 
The Joint Call at EU level had a clear impact on several Member States which stresses the importance 
of launching multilateral operations to obtain national commitments. The initiatives of some Member 
States acting as leaders were also key incentives to get their partners involved. The UNHCR’s call to 
resettle refugees from Iraq was actively promoted by some important Member States. The Netherlands 
and Sweden in particular urged other Member States to respond to the Iraqi refugee crisis. The 
adoption of the Council Conclusions was primarily promoted by Germany in early 2008. Then, in June 
2008, France signed an ad hoc agreement with the UNHCR (the ‘IRAK 500’ programme) embarking 
on a two-year programme for the resettlement of vulnerable Iraqi refugees belonging to minority 
groups. On 20-21st November 2008, i n anticipation of the EU JHA Council meeting, Germany 
adopted a key decision to accept 2,500 Iraqi refugees from Jordan and Syria as part of Europe’s 
response to the refugee crisis. The fact that Germany decided to make a significant contribution and 
accept a large number of Iraqi refugees greatly influenced the adoption of the Council Conclusions.27
The number of countries involved quadrupled, from two in 2007 to eight in 2009. Eventually, 
twelve EU Member States participated in the joint effort to resettle refugees from Iraq: Seven 
programme-based resettlement countries (Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal, 
Denmark, Ireland), and five Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg) 
responded the call on an ad hoc basis.  
  
A second significant incentive to resettle also appear to be twinning projects and supportive 
initiatives among Member States. The Iraqi crisis was the opportunity for the EU and some Member 
States to develop and test joint initiatives and pass on lessons from their own experiences. In the 
framework of the MOST project, representatives of the Spanish government from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs participated in selection missions to Jordan and Syria with the Swedish 
partner in 2007 and 2008 to find out how the resettlement process could be organised. The missions 
involved the selection of Iraqi refugees, and was conducted as part of a learning process focussing on 
refugee selection.  
A Temporary Desk in Iraq (TDI), funded by the European Commission aimed ‘to improve practical 
cooperation on protection, resettlement and the return of Iraqi refugees.’ From May 2009 to October 
2010, this pilot project brought together General Directors of Immigration Services from Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Belgium. The expertise was aimed at being transmitted to the EASO in order 
to support its forthcoming activities in the domain of resettlement. As part of the TDI project, Belgium 
and the Netherlands went on a joint mission to Syria in May 2009. Furthermore, Bulgaria and Slovakia 
                                                     
26 Phone interview with Andreas Ollinen, political adviser to the Swedish Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, 
Ministry of Justice, 16 May 2012. 
27 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, op.cit., p.14 
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participated as observers in the Dutch mission to Syria in October/November 2009.28
Belgium and Luxembourg’s 2009 pilot resettlement schemes in response to the November 2008 
Conclusions were preceded by guidance from the Netherlands. In 2008, Belgium and Luxembourg 
were invited to join the Netherlands on a selection mission in Thailand in order to promote 
resettlement. By the end of 2007, delegations from Belgium and the Czech Republic had observed 
the Dutch resettlement process in Thailand under the twinning project entitled ‘Durable solutions in 
practice.’ A Romanian delegation took part in a selection mission to Jordan in February 2008 under 
the same project. Representatives from Belgium, the Czech Republic and Romania also visited the 
Netherlands, where they were given a general overview of Dutch resettlement policy, including 
quota and reception. 
 In 2010, a 
proposal was made for a similar Desk in Afghanistan.  
Twinning projects are not only aimed at promoting resettlement to potential future resettlement 
countries but also to exchange experiences. Ireland for instance benefited from the support and 
experience of Canada and the UK when it resettled Burmese Rohingya in 2009. ‘ I visited Bradford 
where the Rohingya refugees had been resettled and representatives from Bradford subsequently 
visited Ireland to meet the Rohingya community here. This resulted in some members from both of the 
Rohingya Communities making contact with one another.’29 In 2009, Ireland also took some refugees 
in cooperation with the UK, within a transnational EU funded project. Bulgaria and Belgium also 
participated in that initiative as at that time they were considering participating in programme 
resettlement. The Netherlands’ involvement in fostering further commitments among Member States 
appears to be determinative in the above-mentioned cooperation schemes. Ireland stresses that Finland 
had also provided an excellent support during its early years of resettlement and that it then had the 
opportunity to support Slovenia, Belgium and Bulgaria. ‘We learn from each other all of the time and 
it wouldn’t happen without the EU.’30
The financial contribution of the ERF was also a clear incentive to generate EU Member States’ 
involvement in refugee resettlement. Belgium’s pilot project to resettle refugees from Iraq was 
conditional upon a request for European funding. “Concretely, the selection mission and the transfer 
of the resettled refugees took place within the framework of the ERF community actions project 
“Temporary Desk on Iraq”, which meant that up to 90% of the costs of the selection and transfer of 
refugees could be recuperated through the European Commission. Furthermore, 50% of the reception 
and integration of the resettled refugees was co-financed by the national section of the ERF.” 
 
31
Also Portugal established a multi-annual programme (2008-2013) in the context of the ERF which 




The following changes occurred from 2007/2008 on: 
 The financial incentive is still emphasized by the Ministry to further develop resettlement 
in Portugal. 
• Portugal, which accepted an intake of 33 refugees on an ad hoc basis from January 2006, 
then launched a programme in 2007 to receive 30 refugees a y ear, and formalised its 
commitment through the adoption of a legal provision in 2008. Though Portugal never 
formally responded to the November 2008 Conclusions, it accepted an urgent case of one 
Iraqi family of five who arrived in September 2008 and another Iraqi family who were 
resettled from Syria in 2009. 
                                                     
28 Ibid. p.24 
29 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Written interview with Ewout Adrians, CGRS-FEDASIL, 4 May 2012. 
32 Written interview with the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs, February 2012. 
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• Beside its ‘IRAK 500’ programme, France concluded an agreement with the UNHCR in 
2008 to engage in programme-based resettlement for one hundred files per year. ‘If the Iraq 
issue was an incentive to engage in resettlement, the development of resettlement in the EU 
might have had a positive impact too on the French commitment. France was about to take 
the presidency of the EU (second half of 2008) and prepared the asylum and immigration 
European Pact that included provisions on resettlement and intra-EU relocation. It has to be 
underlined as well that, in 2007, the number of asylum seekers was the lowest of the decade 
(ca 35 000 applications). It might have dispelled a certain reluctance regarding the 
reception of further refugees. Finally, advocacy by Forum réfugiés and France terre d’asile 
might have had an impact too.’33
• In the multi-year plan of the ERF 2008-2011, Spain presented a p roposal to accept 150 
refugees, 50 pe r year. In 2009, M adrid revised its law regulating the right to asylum and 
subsidiary protection and made a specific reference to the prospect to establish a resettlement 
programme in cooperation with the UNHCR and other relevant bodies. It also engaged in a 
resettlement programme during the subsequent years but eventually did not implement its 
resettlement programmes.  
  
• In the UK, the annual quota was increased coinciding with the November 2008 Conclusions 
in 2008/2009 which brought the annual total from 500 to 750 refugees. 
This is all the more on the Eastern side of the EU that the formal commitment is the most 
impressive:  
• Hungary and Slovenia included a reference to resettlement in their respective laws in 2007.  
• The Czech Republic launched its resettlement programme in June 2008 and resettled nine 
Burmese families in October 2008 and February 2009. Twelve other Burmese families were 
resettled during 2010.34
• In Romania, a Government Decision taken in 2008 on t he Resettlement of Foreigners 
provided for resettlement and stated that 120 refugees would be resettled during the period 
2008-2010. Only 38 refugees were resettled in the context of this provision, representing the 
quota due on 2009 and the programme was subsequently suspended. Resettlement was fully 
funded by the ERF.
 
35 The quotas due on 2008 a nd 2010 have not been fulfilled due to the 
delayed approval of Government Decision no. 1596/2009 on the resettlement of refugees in 
Romania, as well as due to the economic and social situation resulting from the global 
economic crisis.36
• After joining the ACTR in 2007, a twinning project with Ireland in the following two years 
and a twinning project with the Netherlands in 2009, Bulgaria established an 
intergovernmental Taskforce on Resettlement in 2010. The objective of this Taskforce was 
to create a draft pilot resettlement programme to be implemented in 2013.  
 
At the end of this period, a new one starts with similar incentives, i.e. group resettlement and 
financial support, being applied in the context of a new refugee crisis. 
                                                     
33 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, France Terre d’Asile, April 2012. 
34 Petr Novak, Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, Know Reset Final conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013.  
35 Written interview with the Romanian Office for Immigration (ROI), 23 January 2012. 
36 Ibid. 
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c) The 2011/2012 Turning Point 
The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean and Group Resettlement Initiatives 
In 2011, a mass influx of refugees began to flow into Tunisia and Egypt as a result of the conflict in 
Libya. In February 2011, the UNHCR made a global call for places for resettlement from Tunisia and 
Egypt. On the 2nd of March 2011, the UNHCR organised a conference of resettlement States and other 
interested countries. That conference resulted in the launching of the Global Resettlement Solidarity 
Initiative for refugees ex-Libya to ease the burden on Tunisia and Egypt which had received tens of 
thousands of refugees. Resettlement was presented as a way to ensure that vulnerable persons did not 
risk dangerous boat journeys across the Mediterranean. The European Commission reacted to the calls 
made by the UNHCR by inviting experts from the Member States to a “resettlement experts meeting 
on refugees stranded in Libya” on the 28th of March 2011.37 The JHA Council of 11-12 April 2011 
argued favourably for the extension of Regional Protection Programmes and claimed that it had the 
objective of alleviating protracted refugee situations, notably through enhancing refugee resettlement. 
The European Commission asked Member States to transfer their annual quotas from the countries 
that they had already pledged to North African countries, if they could not provide new resettlement 
places as the UNHCR and the European Commission requested of them. On the 12th of May 2011, 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström convened a Ministerial Conference, co-chaired with the Hungarian 
Presidency, to discuss and review commitments and pledges from the Member States and the 
Associated Countries in respect of the extension of the pilot project in Malta for the relocation to other 
Member States of persons who were beneficiaries of international protection and the resettlement to 
Europe of refugees stranded in North Africa. The Conference was organised as a co ncrete 
implementation of the solidarity statements included in the Council Conclusions of April 2011.38
In July 2011, the UNHCR stated that twelve countries had pledged 900 places. Almost one third 
were offered in addition to annual resettlement programmes or were an ad hoc contribution. Yet, at the 
end of June, the UNHCR submitted more than 1,000 refugees for resettlement and 80 departed for the 
ETC in Romania for processing by resettlement countries.
  
39 In July 2012, according to the UNHCR, 
twelve countries worldwide had pledged 1,700 dedicated resettlement places, this figure does not 
include the United States of America which offered an open-ended number of places. 5,500 refugees 
were submitted for resettlement worldwide and 1,270 refugees departed for resettlement directly and 
through the ETCs.40
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme (JEURP) 
  
A proposal to establish a Joint EU resettlement Programme was tabled in September 2009 under the 
Swedish Presidency. The aim was to increase the EU’s humanitarian impact, to integrate resettlement 
into external relations policy, to streamline actions of Member States and to make them more cost 
effective.41
                                                     
37 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
 The proposal remained in limbo between institutions mainly because of the annual priority 
setting and because of an argument between the Council and the Parliament about which decision 
procedure to use in connection to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. 
38 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-295_en.htm?locale=fr Memo/11/295, 13/05/2011 
39 UNHCR Projected Globel Resettlement Needs 2012, July 2011, p.10, http://www.unhcr.org/4f0fff0d9.html 
40 UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2013, July 2012, p.11, http://www.unhcr.org/5006aff49.html 
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 2 S eptember 2009 on t he 
establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme [COM(2009) 447 final) 
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On 29 March 2012, the European Parliament voted on the Joint EU Resettlement Programme, 
already approved by the Council. Decision 281/2012/EU of 29 March 2012 amended Decision 
573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 a s part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows.’  
This decision determined common EU resettlement priorities for 2013 and announced an increase 
in the financial assistance that Member States would receive from the European Refugee Fund for the 
resettlement of refugees. In addition to this, that decision also provided for the following changes: 
− The ERF used to only fund the resettlement of refugees from outside the EU to Member 
States but now also funds relocation between Member States. 
− The general rule is that Member States will receive a lump sum of 4,000 Euro for each 
person resettled according to the agreed priorities. Member States who apply for financial 
support from the European Refugee Fund for the first time will receive a lump sum of 6,000 
Euro per resettled refugee.  
Additional funding is also available for those Member States which have not previously or 
have only once received ERF funding for the resettlement of refugees. Those Member States 
will get a lump sum of 5,000 Euro per resettled person. This is particularly relevant for the 
countries that have not yet received ERF funding, or have only received it once and have 
expressed an interest in undertaking resettlement, most notably, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania. Italy and Spain have made ERF 
pledges in the past, but have not fulfilled these, and in that case would still be eligible for the 
extra funding.42
− The JEURP widens the categories of refugees whose resettlement is supported with EU 
funding in 2013. The amendment to the ERF adds specific vulnerable groups and geographic 
priorities to the existing categories of refugees whose resettlement is funded under the ERF.  
  
To facilitate the calculation of funding needs through the European Refugee Fund for 2013, 
Member States were asked to provide the Commission with an estimate of the number of persons per 
category they planned to resettle in 2013. 
The European Commission continued to fund a number of projects to support and enhance practical 
cooperation relating to resettlement in the EU, such as ‘ Practical cooperation in EU resettlement’ 
jointly implemented from 2010 onward by the ICMC, IOM and the UNHCR and ten Member states 
(Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the United Kingdom, 
Slovakia and Sweden). 'Paving the way - a handbook on the Reception and Integration of Resettled 
Refugees' was produced in 2011 within the framework of this project.43
‘Linking in EU Resettlement’, launched in September 2011, aims at further developing the 
achievements of the practical cooperation project.
 
44
Also significant is the establishment of an EU Resettlement Network, an initiative co-funded by the 
European Refugee Fund and involving IOM, the UNHCR and the ICMC. The objectives of the 
network include the promotion of information exchange, collaboration, and policy development. 
 It aims to strengthen the expertise of European 
practitioners at all stages of resettlement and the integration process, including the capacity of 
municipalities and civil society. It focusses on the reception and integration of refugees at the local 
level and linking the pre-departure and post-arrival phases in order to make resettlement more 
successful.  
                                                     
42 Written interview with UNHCR Hungary, April 2012. 
43 See : http://www.icmc.net/pubs/paving-way-a-handbook-reception-and-integration-resettled-refugees 
44 http://www.resettlement.eu/page/linking-eu-resettlement-project 
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Activities undertaken by the Network include stakeholder meetings, training for practitioners and 
pilots of innovative activities.45
Impact at National Level 
 
The UNHCR and the EU’s call to resettle refugees from the Shousha camp in Tunisia was responded 
to by Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Spain. Ireland also resettled some refugees from Tunisia 
within the existing quota, as well as Portugal and Sweden. Again, group resettlement initiatives with 
financial support were key incentives in convincing Member States to commit to resettlement both in 
responding to the refugee crisis and in making a st rategic use of resettlement and thus utilising 
resettlement in a more sustainable fashion. Indeed, Belgium, Germany and Spain took the opportunity 
to engage in programme-based resettlement. 
The following changes occurred in 2011/2012: 
• In 2011, Germany agreed to launch a resettlement programme from 2012 on, pl anning to 
resettle 900 refugees over three years. 195 refugees were resettled from the Shousha camp to 
Germany in September 2012, and 105 Iraqi refugees arrived from Turkey in October 2012. 
• In preparation for the European Commission meeting on 28 March 2011, the inner cabinet 
of the Belgian federal government decided on 24 March 2011 to resettle 25 African 
refugees who fled from Libya to Tunisia after the outbreak of the revolution. Furthermore, 
the new Belgian government agreement of December 2011 stated that Belgium would 
participate in resettlement programmes on a European level. Belgium pledged to resettle 
100 refugees in 2013.  
• In 2012, Spain resettled 80 refugees from the Shousha camp and renewed its engagement to 
resettle on a programme-basis in 2013-2014, 30 refugees a year. Already at the end of the 
1990s, UNHCR announced that Spain was among the newly emerging resettlement 
countries.46 It was then removed from this list since Spain never implemented any 
programme. In 2008, it presented a proposal to accept 150 refugees over three years, but this 
provision was never carried out.47
• Poland reformed its Aliens Act in 2011 which now refers to resettlement. The UK has been 
developing a twinning arrangement with the Polish government to support them in their 
aspirations to become a resettlement country 
 During the subsequent years, the Council of Ministers 
approved an annual programme and even raised the quota from 75 refugees planned in 2010 
to 100 r efugees planned in 2011. N one of these programmes have been implemented. 
Nevertheless, in 2012, t he Spanish Council of Ministers again approved an annual 
resettlement programme for 2013-2014 and also resettled refugees from Eritrea, Sudan, and 
Somalia in July 2012 in response to a call made by the UNHCR. Instead of considering the 
latter resettlement as an ad hoc resettlement which it seemed to be, Spain claimed that it was 
based on the 2009 Asylum law and counted within the quota approved for 2011. 
• Romania adopted a new programme. In 2012, a Government Decision was proposed for the 
Amendment of the 2008 Government Decision on the Resettlement of Refugees in Romania and 
set the number of refugees to be resettled over two years (2012 and 2013) at 40.  
                                                     
45 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.20 
46 Joanne van Selm, Tamara Woroby, Erin Patrick, Monica Watts, The feasibility of setting up resettlement schemes in EU 
Member States or at EU level, against the background of the Common European Asylum System and the goal of a Common 
Asylum Procedure, Migration Policy Institute, Tender n°. DG.JAI-A2/2002/001, 2003, executive summary, p.vii 
47 Written interview with an advisor to the Spanish Ministry for Employment and Social Security, also the former sub-
director for Immigration, under the Office of the Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration, April 2012. 
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• The Hungarian Government announced its decision to become a resettlement country in 
October 2010 and confirmed its commitment through a pledge submitted to the Ministerial 
Conference organized by UNHCR in Geneva in December 2011. In response to the “Arab 
spring” in 2011 a Governmental Decision (No. 1139/2011) was adopted on the launch of an 
asylum solidarity programme in relation to the situation in North Africa. On this basis, 
Hungary intended to focus its resettlement commitment to the North-African region.48
• In Bulgaria, the instability of the government as well as practical difficulties had postponed 
the official launching and the implementation of the resettlement programme prepared since 
2010.
 
Hungary promised to resettle a family of five to eight persons in 2012-2013 as a pilot 
programme but eventually resettled only one refugee.  
49
• Slovenia promised to resettle on a programme-basis in 2014.  
 Yet, in June 2012, the political decision on the submission of a pilot resettlement 
quota of 20 persons in 2013 was adopted. Unfortunately, the application for EU funds was 
deposited after the deadline. 
For some Member States, the EU’s financial incentive is determining their commitment. In 
Belgium, the 2011 de cision was, like in 2009, c onditional upon s ecuring European funding. ‘The 
choice of countries has until now not been based on strategic choices connected to Belgian Foreign 
Policy. In 2011 the decision was made to resettle from Tunisia and not Egypt for a pragmatic reason: 
European funding was only available for “urgent resettlement”, while in Egypt UNHCR focused on 
resolving the “protracted refugee situation”‘50
Being part of a joint effort is also a clear motivation. For Belgium, participating in worldwide 
and EU operations is a key incentive. This was the case when it resettled in 2009 and 2011.
. The European Commission indeed included “urgent 
resettlement” in its annual priorities for the ERF programme for community actions for 2011 through 
which up to 90% of the operation could once again be financed by Europe. 
51 This is 
also true of Bulgaria52 and Italy. The Italian government has been involved in discussions with the 
UNHCR regarding the closure of the Iraqi refugee camp named Camp Ashraf and the resettlement of 
the Iranians refugees that were hosted there. It seemed that Italy was not going to bind itself unless 
others were willing to join53 - the general attitude of waiting unless others follow shows that 
resettlement probably would be more efficiently organised at the European level as it would 
automatically involve burden sharing among Member States and therefore they might be more willing 
to cooperate in such a context. In Romania, ‘the Government’s decision to get involved in the 
resettlement of refugees process was influenced by the political will of strengthening Romania's status 
as an important global partner by undertaking efforts and responsibilities incumbent upon the 
international community in the area of refugee protection. Since the resettlement of refugees plays an 
important role in the EU’s external policies on asylum, the involvement of Romania in the resettlement 
programme was driven also by the desire to assume its obligations as an EU Member State.’54
 
 
                                                     
48 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
49 Anna Andreeva, Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
50 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Anna Andreeva, Know Reset Final Conference, op.cit. 
53
 Phone interview with the head of unit VII of the Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation in Migration, International 
Protection and International Adoptions, DG Italians abroad and migration policies at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
February 2012.  
54 Written interview with ROI, op.cit. 
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An evolution has occurred in resettlement law and policy and has led to Member States 
increasingly committing to resettling refugees. However, an extension of the commitments in 
resettling refugees in the EU is not linear and does not necessarily mean that the number of refugees 
resettled in the EU will steadily rise. As mentioned above, some commitments may be postponed, not 
implemented or revised.  
2.2 The Development of a Formal Basis for Resettlement in the EU 
The adoption of a legal basis for resettlement was not considered as necessary by many stakeholders, 
as resettlement is a voluntary practice rather than a legal duty. Numerous stakeholders insist that the 
resettlement decision is political. The impact of changes in governments on State involvement in 
resettlement confirms the political nature of the decision to resettle. This was the case recently in both 
Bulgaria and Belgium. Yet, for Oskar Ekblad, Head of Resettlement Activities in Sweden, a barrier for 
many EU countries seems to be the lack of necessary legislation.55
Thirteen EU Member states now refer to refugee resettlement in the law governing Aliens and/or 
Asylum
 During the past decade, most of the 
resettlement countries have undertaken to formalise their practice or prepare a future practice with the 
adoption of a formal framework.  
56 and fifteen have adopted government acts. Among these, sixteen57
Although they have a formal basis to do so, Slovenia and Bulgaria have not yet resettled any refugees 
while Poland has resettled without using the legal basis relating to resettlement. Contrary to this, 
Scandinavian countries have long had the experience of resettlement before they undertook the step of 
adapting their legislation accordingly. The Netherlands have not included any resettlement-related 
provision in their Aliens law despite the fact that that State has been resettling for over forty years. 
 have already effectively 
resettled and thirteen have resettled on a programme-basis (see Annex 1). The legal framework is very 
diverse from one EU Member State to another. Besides, the existence of a formal basis does not imply 
the effective practice of resettlement and its absence does not prevent a Member State from resettling. 
Most of the ‘new’ Eastern EU Member states have adopted a specific provision related to 
resettlement: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia. The Baltic states, on the other 
hand, are reluctant to join any resettlement activity. Those five ‘new’ Member States have taken the 
opportunity of adapting their asylum legislation for the EU acquis to introduce a r eference to 
resettlement. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, no provision has been introduced in law but in 2010 a 
Intergovernmental Task Force on Resettlement (RWG) was created, with the objective of creating a 
draft pilot resettlement programme. It required two years before the Council of Ministers issued a 
decision in 2012 to launch the Pilot Resettlement Programme to be implemented in 2014. In terms of 
implementation, only the Czech Republic has effectively undertaken its resettlement programme. 
Romania has been only able to resettle for one year, 2008, ou t of the three years initially planned. 
Despite a specific provision introduced in 2007, Hungary has not resettled any refugee up to 2013 
when it resettled one person. Slovenia has not resettled yet and Poland has not resettled on the basis of 
the legal provision introduced in 2011.  
Those new Member States were approached by the UNHCR, which used accession to the EU in 
order to advocate for refugee resettlement in countries, which were eager to show their good will and 
commitment in EU and international affairs. They are also particularly motivated by the financial 
                                                     
55 Phone interview, op.cit. 
56 Czech Republic (1999), Denmark (2005), Finland (2004), Germany (2004), Hungary (2007), Poland (2011), Portugal 
(2008), Ireland (1996), Romania (2006), Slovenia (2007), Spain (2009), Sweden (2005), UK (2002). 
57 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK. And even eighteen if we add Hungary which planned the resettlement of one 
family in 2012-2013 and eventually resettled one person, and Poland which resettled 16 pe rsons through a personal 
spontaneous initiative of its Prime Minister in 2011. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 15
Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames
incentives introduced by the EU which explains the wave of commitments after the adoption of the 
ERF for the period 2008-2013. Indeed, while the lump sum granted to States upon resettling a refugee 
may seem low and insufficient in Member States with a high cost of living, it is considered as being 
important in countries where the receiving and integration capacity is a work in progress.58 In contrast, 
the Irish management team argues that ‘resettlement cannot be based on an “incentive” because there 
are costs to the State not just first year costs but ongoing costs for many many years. For medical 
cases the costs can be serious but it is a decision to save a life. The incentive to resettle has, first and 
foremost, to be humanitarian. People, and particularly children are living in dire circumstances and 
they are in need of an opportunity to build a life. The EU gives €4,000 per head for taking from their 
RPPs (Regional Protection Programmes) and other vulnerable groups. It is good to get it but it would 
not be a reason to join.’59
Only a few other Member States have adopted a specific provision to prepare for a commitment to 
resettlement: this was the case of the UK, which changed its legislation in 2002 and started a 
programme in 2004; the same for Ireland, which introduced a provision in 1996 a nd started a 
programme in 1998. 
 
The law sometimes comes afterwards. In Portugal, the 2007 pr ogramme was launched by a 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers, and its sustainability was confirmed by the corresponding 
revision of Asylum law in 2008. T he Scandinavian countries have inserted some references to 
resettlement in law during the 2000s, long after their programmes had started. 
In a majority of EU Member states, the formal basis for resettlement has primarily and 
exclusively come from the executive authorities rather than from the Parliament. This confirms the 
voluntary, and thus political dimension of resettlement. The commitment in refugee resettlement is 
seen as a governmental decision, in addition, it is based upon political considerations more than any 
legal obligation.  
Moreover, a legal reference to resettlement is generally accompanied or followed by executive 
measures, in order to specify the conditions in which resettlement shall be undertaken: the quota 
(Ireland, Slovenia) and sometimes the target (Czech Republic) or geographical allocation of 
resettlement (Finland, Sweden). Some executive measures are the basis for an ad hoc resettlement in 
response to a specific call for resettlement. This was specifically the case in 2009 in response to 
UNHCR’s call related to the Iraqi refugee crisis (Belgium, Germany) and in 2011 in response to the 
refugee crisis in Libya (Belgium, Germany, Hungary). In some other states, an executive measure is 
taken to shape a programme, like in Bulgaria.  
Nine EU Member states have absolutely no formal basis for resettlement and for some of them, this 
is clearly linked to a refusal to commit to resettlement. With the exception of Austria and 
Luxembourg, all of these states are situated at EU’s external borders: the three Baltic states 
(Lithuania60
                                                     
58 Anna Andreeva, Final Conference, op.cit. 
, Estonia, Latvia), plus Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus. They invoke certain socio-
economic difficulties (Baltic states) and in the reception of aliens (Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Italy) to 
refuse resettlement. Instead, the latter have called for the relocation of refugees from their territory to 
other EU Member states. The absence of legal basis however did not prevent Austria and Luxembourg 
to resettle some refugees on an ad hoc basis. Yet, Austria considers the reception of 31 Iraqis in 2011 
as being the Church’s initiative and as a humanitarian evacuation. Luxembourg resettled 28 Iraqis in 
59 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
60 According to the representative of the Migration Department, the Lithuanian position on resettlement issue is clear – 
Lithuania is in favour of participation in resettlement programmes only on voluntary basis and refuses to take a part in 
any such programmes. Communication with the representative of the Migration Department, 18th of November 2012. 
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2009. In Slovakia, according to a recent political resolution,61
France and Italy are interesting examples of by-passing a lack of basis for granting asylum outside 
the territory. The lack of national legislation explains the need for a subsequent post-arrival process for 
resettled refugees to obtain a status. In both countries, the procedure of resettlement has to start 
abroad. In Italy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must first agree to the resettlement project and allow 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue visas to the selected refugees so that they can apply for refugee 
status once on Italian soil. In normal circumstances, issuing a visa to someone requesting asylum is 
prohibited and considered as being favourable to irregular migration.
 resettlement is expected to begin in the 
future years, it is also committed to relocation and to humanitarian reception through its ETC.  
62
While legal and other formal basis enabling refugee resettlement have been adopted in a growing 
number of EU Member States, the different provisions relating to resettlement are all country specific. 
There is no standard model shared in the EU. Those provisions can be divided between those which 
mention the UNHCR and those which do n ot; those which specifically mention the word 
‘resettlement’ and those which do no t; those which address the possibility to resettle without any 
details and those which specify the procedures to follow and/or the rights granted. Paradoxically, the 
countries which detail resettlement the most are also the countries which have not resettled yet, such 
as Poland and Slovenia. 
 On Italian soil resettled persons 
can ask for refugee status and the request is assessed, and generally confirmed, through priority 
procedures by the relevant Territorial Commission. Similarly, in France, the government has 
committed, through an agreement with the UNHCR concluded in 2008, to annually resettle a hundred 
cases on a dossier-basis. Yet, it gives OFPRA (Office Français Pour les Réfugiés et Apatrides) the 
responsibility to grant the refugee status on the basis of the resettled persons’ application when they 
arrive in France. 
The diversity in the formal basis for resettlement is even greater in substance, when looking at the 
content of resettlement frameworks and policies in the EU Member States.  
3. Diversity in the Content of Resettlement Frameworks and Policies 
While ‘being part of the club’ is a k ey motivation for Member States getting engaged in refugee 
resettlement, Member States are extremely unreceptive to any proposal to harmonise the selection of 
refugees to be resettled. The ERF is a w ay in which the selection of refugees may be influenced. 
Nevertheless, the EU is unlikely to develop a common selection procedure nor is it likely to reach an 
agreement as to how to divide the resettled refugees amongst Member States . Even more problematic 
is the diversity in the status and rights granted to the resettled persons and the integration capacity of 
Member States. 
3.1 Diversity in Selection Criteria and Procedures  
The UNHCR has developed standards to identify and select the refugees who are most in need of 
protection. EU funding instruments have partly supported those standards. 
According to UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, ‘Refugee status determination is a precondition to 
resettlement.’63
                                                     
61 Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic- Perspective until the year 2020, 31 August 2011 
 The 1951 Convention and its Protocol constitute the primary refugee protection 
instrument which provides the definition of a refugee. The UNHCR was initially established to seek 
62 Interview with Counsellor Fiammetta Milesi Ferretti, agent for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on t he National 
Commission for Refugees (Commissione Nazionale per il diritto d’asilo), 5 May 2012. 
63 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 p.21. 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 17
Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames
solutions for refugees, as they were be defined in the 1951 Convention.64 On the basis of the ‘soft law’ 
which has made refugee law evolve, through Declarations and Resolutions adopted at inter-state level on 
the one hand, and regional legal instruments adopted in Africa (the 1969 OAU Convention governing the 
specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) and in Latin America (the 1984 Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees) on t he other hand, the UNHCR has extended its mandate to persons affected by the 
indiscriminate effects of armed conflict or other events which have seriously disrupted public order: ‘In 
addition to individuals who meet the criteria in the 1951 Convention definition, UNHCR recognises as 
refugees persons who are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and unable to return 
there owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from 
generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.’65




− Legal and/or physical protection needs of the refugee in the country of refuge (this includes a 
threat of refoulement); 
 
− Survivors of torture and/or violence, where repatriation or the conditions of asylum could 
result in further traumatization and/or heightened risk; or where appropriate treatment is not 
available; 
− Medical Needs, in particular life-saving treatment that is unavailable in the country of 
refuge; 
− Women and Girls at Risk, who have protection problems particular to their gender; 
− Family Reunification, when resettlement is the only means to reunite refugee family 
members who, owing to refugee flight of displacement, are separated by borders or 
continents; 
− Children and Adolescents at Risk, where a best interests determination supports resettlement; 
− Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions, which generally is relevant only when 
other solutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future, when resettlement can be used 
strategically, and/or when it can open possibilities for comprehensive solutions. 
Some EU Initiatives have come in support to UNHCR resettlement standards and policies. 
The EU considers and funds resettlement operations only when they follow the UNHCR’s requests 
(Decision No 573/ 2007/EC (Article 3 (1) (d)). The transfer of refugees from a third country to an EU 
country would not be considered resettlement and funded as such if it is carried out independently 
from the UNHCR. The EU also supports the resettlement of specific categories of vulnerable persons 
on the basis of the UNHCR’s selection criteria and prioritizes the resettlement of some refugee groups 
identified by the UNHCR as being in urgent need of group resettlement. 
Decision 281/2012/EU of 29 M arch 2012 amending Decision 573/2007/EC has extended the 
funding of resettlement to the following categories of vulnerable groups: 
− women and children at risk,  
− unaccompanied minors,  
− survivors of violence and/or torture,  
                                                     
64 ‘A refugee is any person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’. 
65 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011 p.19. 
66 Ibid., p.37. 
18 KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
Delphine Perrin - Frank McNamara
− persons having serious medical needs that can be addressed only if they are resettled,  
− persons in need of emergency or urgent resettlement for legal and/or physical protection 
needs. 
The amended ERF also prioritizes the resettlement of persons from a geographical location on the 
list of common priorities. For 2013, this list includes: Congolese refugees in the Great Lakes Region 
(Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia); Iraqi refugees in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan; Afghan 
refugees in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran; Somali refugees in Ethiopia; Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Thailand; Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. 
The amended ERF still funds resettlement of persons from a country or region designated for the 
implementation of a Regional Protection Programme, and these programmes have been extended. The 
first two Regional Protection Programmes targeted the Newly Independent States (NIS) (Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus) and the Great Lakes Region (Tanzania). They now also cover the Horn of 
Africa (Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen) and North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia and Libya). 
 
a) The Selection Process 
During the last decade, most of the resettlement operations carried out in EU Member States have 
relied on UNHCR pre-selection, with some exceptions: 
− In 2011, Austria resettled 31 Iraqis directly from Iraq where they had been selected by the 
Church, through representatives in Iraq of the archdiocese of Vienna. This operation was 
following the initiative of the Cardinal Christoph Schönborn.67 The Austrian authorities 
emphasize that the resettlement activities of these Christians from Iraq were a humanitarian 
evacuation and not resettlement. Austria defines resettlement only those evacuations where 
refugees are evacuated from a third country and not from their country of origin.68
− In 2011, on his way back from a visit to Tunisia, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs took 
a group of refugees on bo ard of his plane, who after escaping from Libya, had found a 
temporary shelter in Tunisia.
 The 
activities that have been carried out by Austria were an expression of solidarity and not a 
commitment to any further resettlement in the future. 
69
It should be noted that these two countries are not considered as being resettlement countries. 
 
Apart from these isolated examples, EU Member States select the refugees to be resettled from a 
list referred to them by UNHCR. Yet, only six Member States refer to the UNHCR in their laws as one 
of the basis or as the basis of resettlement, i.e. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland and Spain.  
Section 7§(5) of the Hungarian Asylum Law provides that the Minister may grant refugee status to 
an alien who was granted recognition as a refugee by the competent authorities of another country or 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Czech law, Section 90 
(Chapter XII, Joint, Delegating and Temporary Provisions) is similar: ‘The Czech Republic may grant 
asylum to an alien without previous proceedings if he/she has been recognized as a refugee according 
to an international agreement by a decision of the Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR).’ Also 
                                                     
67 http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium/pressenews/presseaussendungen/2011/ankunft-von-30-irakischen-christen-in-
oesterreich.html (February 2012). 
68 Interview with the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, 6 February 2012. 
69 Sources: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs - note available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/foreign_minister_radoslaw_sikorski_brings_home_north_african_refugees and in the 
press and radio: http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/387167,Sikorski-wroci-do-Polski-z-uchodzcami-z-Libii; 
Interviews with Mrs Agnieszka Kunicka, Head of the Refugee and Repatriates Counselling Centre, Polish Humanitarian 
Action, and Mr Maciej Fagasiński, Amnesty International Poland, May 2012.  
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Section 8 of the Danish Alien Act: ‘Upon application, a residence permit will be issued to an alien 
who arrives in Denmark under an agreement made with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees or similar international agreement (…).’ Section 90 of the Finnish Act (Refugee quota) 
stipulates ‘Under the refugee quota, Finland may admit for resettlement persons considered refugees 
by UNHCR or other aliens in need of international protection (…)’. In the Irish Refugee Law, the 
following subsection was inserted in 2003: ‘The Minister may, after consultation with the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enter into agreements with the High Commissioner for the reception and resettlement 
in the State of refugees.’ The Spanish Law on a sylum makes specific reference to resettlement 
programmes in the First Additional Provision: ‘The protection framework envisaged under the present 
law shall apply to persons who gain entry to Spain through resettlement programmes developed by the 
Government, in conjunction with the UNHCR and in some cases, other relevant international 
organisations (…)’ (unofficial translation). 
The other Member States do not mention UNHCR in their national laws.  
When referring some cases to resettlement states, the UNHCR takes into account the preferences 
and criteria previously discussed with and indicated by the Member States. Then, resettlement States 
generally add their own selection process, either on a dossier-basis or through selection missions, and 
may search for certain criteria which the refugees must satisfy.  
The selection process in different States is extremely diverse. Criteria and procedures vary from 
one country to another. They may also vary from one year/period to another.  
While Luxembourg and Portugal have exclusively resettled on a dossier-basis, for some Member 
States, dossier selection has become the rule after experiencing selection missions. In Ireland, face-to-
face interviews are considered as the best form of selection. ‘You get a feel for the people to be 
resettled, can gather specific information, correct bio data etc. hear stories of their experiences first 
hand, explore family links that are not always visible on the RRF. With this information you can better 
prepare for their arrival and reduce surprises for service providers. You also have the opportunity to 
dispel myths and reduce unrealistic expectations and answer questions through a short cultural 
orientation programme held in association with the interviews. We also talk separately to the 
teenagers, the women and men as separate groups so that each one could ask their specific questions. 
That can be very interesting and enlightening.’ Yet, Ireland conducted selection missions only from 
2005 to 2008 ‘due to the reduced numbers (of resettled refugees) at the moment.’ ‘We too must be 
realistic about the benefits based on the costs and effort required by many organisations to organise 
such missions. The numbers we are currently taking do not warrant missions.’70
Spain, which organised selection missions to Tunisia in 2011 and in 2012 to Syria, decided to base 
its 2013-2014 programme on dossiers. Italy only had selection missions in Iraq in 2009 to assess the 
local situation. Future resettlements to Bulgaria will be selected on a dossier basis.  
  
Selection on a dossier-basis does not necessarily mean an easier and faster process. For instance, 
France refuses half of the dossiers submitted.71
 
 Around eighty percent of all refugees from Iraq 
selected were accepted through selection missions, and twenty percent were selected based on dossiers 
provided by the UNHCR. Selection missions enable the authorities to have a clear and more realistic 
idea of how refugees live in their country of first asylum. Yet, selection missions come in addition to 
interviews already carried out by the UNHCR and may be considered by refugees as being an endless 
and exhausting process.  
                                                     
70 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
71 Matthieu Tardis, France Terre d’Asile, 31 May 2013. 
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Most of Member States use both selection methods. Among the ad hoc resettlement countries, 
Belgium selected on a dossier-basis from Tunisia in 2011 while it organised a selection mission to 
Syria and Jordan in 2009. ‘For reasons of objectivity and verification it was decided at the time that a 
selection mission was necessary and that a dossier-based selection was not desirable. An important 
reason for this was the specificity of the refugee population: a section of the nominated dossiers 
involved persons with possible ties with the Ba’ath-regime of Saddam Hussein. The interviews carried 
out on location delivered additional and relevant information, that made it possible for the CGRS to 
make final decisions in questionable or complex dossiers, in both a positive and a negative manner.’  
For the resettlement of Eritrean and Congolese refugees from the Shousha camp in Tunisia in 2011, 
a selection mission was also planned initially. ‘However, it was decided that this mission would be 
cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation in the Shousha camp and the subsequent request 
by UNHCR not to organise a selection mission. Because the protection need, primarily that of the 
Eritreans, was overwhelmingly clear and the RRF’s of UNHCR were in general sufficiently extensive 
and detailed for profound analysis of the credibility and the refugee criteria, the Secretary of State 
Wathelet decided to follow the advice of UNHCR. This dossier-based selection was evaluated as 
positive and after arrival no cases of abuse where established. Cost cutting and speed of execution are 
the most important advantages of dossier-based selection.’72
The Czech Republic has opted for a policy of selection missions but dossier selection is still 
possible. Slovenia has taken the exact opposite stance for future resettlement. In Denmark and 
Finland, the rule is to select through missions but urgent cases can be selected through dossiers. 
Similarly, Belgium foresaw that if ‘it were to evolve to a resettlement country with a set programme, it 
would be possible for example to opt to reserve a number of places for dossier-based selection and 
urgent or emergency resettlement places. Another part of the quota, more specifically the priority 
groups, could then be selected through missions.’
 
73
In the UK, refugees are generally selected for GPP resettlement during selection missions. Some 




The Netherlands, which suspended missions from 1999 to 2005, chooses a hundred refugees a year 
on a dossier-basis and four hundreds through missions. Sweden has a specific approach, and selects 
more than half of its quota though dossiers and less than a half through missions. 
 Finland accepts around one hundred emergency cases a year on a dossier basis 
as an exception to the normal procedure which is to organise selection missions conducted by MIGRI 
officials, representatives of Employment and Economical Development Centres and, if necessary, 
security officials. In recent years, local municipalities have also taken part in the missions.  
Four Member States have opted for a selection on a mission-basis only, namely Germany, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
Selection missions are conducted in countries of first asylum, but may also be organised in an ETC 
in Romania or in Slovakia. The UK for instance selected some Palestinians from Syrian/Iraqi border 
camps in the ETC in Romania in 2009.  
Whether or not they select on a d ossier or mission basis, some Member States may require the 
selected refugees to apply for their status after arrival. This is the case in France and in Italy, as 
already mentioned above. This decision has most likely been made on the basis of legal reasoning: the 
law does not allow the granting of status abroad. France terre d’asile notes that, even if OFPRA (the 
French Office for Stateless persons and Refugees) tries to examine the applications on an accelerated 
                                                     
72 Written interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
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basis and always provides a positive answer, this additional application process has a psychological 
impact on the refugees. Added to this, the additional application process also represents extra work for 
integration stakeholders. The process of integration is also postponed.75 In 2013, F rance made a 
number of commitments to reduce the obstacles that exist for refugees. As a result, resettled persons 
will not need to wait for their refugee stay permit – which takes months – before being able to access 
integration programmes, including French language classes. They will be able to sign their integration 
contract upon arrival. On top of this, OFPRA may no l onger interview refugees and only apply a 
‘transfer of protection’.76 This is already the case in Belgium, where the resettled refugee, upon arrival 
in Belgium, must also go through the same steps as a regular asylum seeker even though this is merely 
a formality (i.e. no interview is carried out by the Immigration Service, nor by the CGRS).77
The post-arrival application process in addition to the pre-arrival selection process exists in nine 
Member States, i.e. Belgium, Italy and France as have been already mentioned, as well as the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Romania, Hungary and Poland where it is foreseen in the future. Finally, in 
Sweden the post-arrival application process is optional. The majority of those countries have 
committed to resettlement on a p rogramme-basis. Only Sweden, among them, is a traditional 
resettlement country, and the post-arrival application process is not a requirement but a p ossibility. 
The resettled persons receive their permanent residence permit independently of their status. The 
status of refugees can enable the resettled persons to have better access to some rights, such as family 
reunification. The requirement of a post-arrival process is not based on the fact that resettled persons 
have been selected on a dossier-basis since Sweden, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and 
Romania also organise selection missions. This additional application process still prolongs the road to 
protection for vulnerable persons who have already followed an extremely long process to be 
recognised as refugee by the UNHCR, then being selected by UNHCR to be resettled, then by the EU 
Member State in the country of first asylum. It is thus recommended to abandon this additional 
process or at least to make it optional like in Sweden. 
 
 
b) The Selection Criteria 
Some resettlement states have advised the UNHCR that they are only prepared to accept refugees from 
certain locations or that they wish to exclude or favour certain categories of refugees. The UNHCR 
takes these profile restrictions into account when referring refugee cases to the different receiving 
States. In addition, those countries may add some other criteria in selecting refugees on a dossier or 
mission-basis. Those selection criteria thus vary from one Member State to another. They may be 
based on a series of national factors, that can be political, economic, legal, etc.  
Geneva Convention and Mandate Refugees 
Some Member States do not wish to depart from the refugee definition provided by the Geneva 
Convention and would not resettle refugees who do not meet its criteria. This is, for example, true in 
the case of the Czech Republic. This is also a legal requirement in Hungary (Asylum Law, Section 
7§(5)). The Romanian Law (art.3(5)) similarly requires that resettled persons meet the requirements of 
the Geneva Convention. However, other Member States include the possibility to resettle persons who 
would meet the conditions to be granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection (e.g. 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden). In contrast, the Irish Refugee Act states that the person does not need to 
meet the definition of a refugee. In Section 24, ‘“A programme refugee” means a person to whom 
leave to enter and remain in the State for temporary protection or resettlement as part of a group of 
persons has been given by the Government and whose name is entered in a register established and 
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76 Ibid. 
77 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
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maintained by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whether or not such person is a refugee within the 
meaning of the definition of “refugee” in section 2.’ The wording of the Finnish Act is also quite 
open: Section 90 s tates that ‘Under the refugee quota, Finland may admit for resettlement persons 
considered refugees by UNHCR or other aliens in need of international protection’; Section 92 
stipulates among the Requirements for admitting aliens into the country under the refugee quota, that 
‘1) The alien is in need of international protection with regard to his or her home country, 2) The 
alien is in need of resettlement from the first country of asylum, 3) The requirements for admitting and 
integrating the alien into Finland have been assessed, 4) There are no obstacles under section 36 to 
issuing a residence permit.’ 
ECRE advocates that ‘the determination of a protection status for resettlement within a European 
Resettlement Programme should be flexible, involving an inclusive interpretation of both the refugee 
definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention and of persons qualifying for subsidiary protection 
according to the EU Qualification Directive. Refugee Status Determination should also strongly (…) 
allow for resettlement to be extended to refugees recognised under the UNHCR mandate, including 
those recognised under the extended mandate.’78
As stated in the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, ‘the prima facie group determination is more 




Group Resettlement and Strategic Use of Resettlement 
 Most of the Member States would actually accept the resettlement of persons 
who do not necessarily fulfill the Geneva Convention criteria but would correspond to the subsidiary 
protection or humanitarian protection criteria. Yet, the status granted to those resettled persons would 
thus very likely be less protective than refugee status.  
As mentioned above, the UNHCR has an active role in identifying “priority caseloads” for 
resettlement to orientate resettlement states’ attention on certain refugee situations.  
Recently resettled groups have included: Liberian refugees from Guinea and Sierra Leone, Somali 
refugees from Kenya, Burundian refugees from Tanzania, Congolese refugees from Burundi, Eritrean 
refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees from Saudi Arabia, Afghan refugees from Tadjikistan, 
Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan, Burmese refugees from Thailand and Malaysia and Bhutanese 
refugees from Nepal.80
The observation of national statistics clearly shows the participation of EU Member States to group 
resettlements and the sharing of the same groups among some Member States. Iraqi refugees have 
been resettled in eleven Member States, with the largest contributors being Germany, France, the UK 
and Finland. The same groups of refugees may be resettled over several years. Like Germany and 
France, the Netherlands has resettled Iraqis for many years from the early 1990s. In 2010, t he 
Netherlands’ quota allocated 150 places for Iraqi refugees. Likewise in the UK, which had pledged 
that two-thirds of the 750 annual places would be reserved for Iraqis in 2008. The UK continued to 
resettle refugees from Iraq in 2010 and 2011.
 The caseloads identified for 2012 were: Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; 
Iraqis and Iranians in Turkey, Afghans in Pakistan; Afghans in Iran; Somalis in Dadaab Camp in 
Kenya; Colombians in South America; Eritreans in East Sudan; North Africans displaced from Libya. 
81
Burmese refugees have been resettled in Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and have represented the 
largest number of resettled persons in the Czech Republic, Denmark and Finland during the past 
 
                                                     
78 ECRE AD10/12/2008/ext/AB, ‘Concrete steps towards a European Resettlement Programme’, Brussels, 10 December 2008. 
79 op.cit., p.19. 
80 Ibid., p.57 
81 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, op.cit., pp.25, 27. 
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decade.82
A strategic use of resettlement can become part of a State’s foreign policy. The Czech Republic 
explains the focus of its resettlement programme on the Burmese by the long-term support for the 
Burmese democratic movement. Burma has long been a priority country for Czech foreign policy – 
former President Václav Havel nominated Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for the Nobel Peace Prize.
 Congolese have been resettled in Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, the UK and 
Belgium; Bhutanese refugees have been received in Denmark and the Netherlands, and Afghan 
refugees have been resettled in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, among others.  
83 The 
Netherlands is also deeply influenced in its choice of mission destinations by the potential to make 
strategic use of resettlement. In their view, resettlement should contribute to the improvement of 
refugee protection and resettlement and should be the final cornerstone of the three durable solutions 
(return, local integration in the region and resettlement). The Dutch mission to Sudan in 2012 is a 
good example of the strategic selection of a mission destination.84
Among refugee groups, certain caseloads have been labelled “risky”, such as the Somalis in Kenya, 
and others have constituted “favoured” caseloads, such as the Burmese from Thailand. The latter are 
deemed to be a low security risk and are believed to have attributes that make it easier for them to 
adjust to life in the resettlement country.
 
This has led to situations where resettlement states actively 
compete for some groups of refugees while ignoring others in equally vulnerable situations.
 The Dutch Minister for Immigration 
and Asylum recently proposed that resettlement be used as strategically as possible with regard to the 
other objectives of the country’s migration policy. 
85 As a 
result, Afghans were the largest refugee population in 2011 but were ninth
 
when it came to 
resettlement. The Burmese, on the other hand, were seventh
 
in overall population size but second in 
terms of the numbers resettled. Some larger refugee groups (the Sudanese, Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Serbians) did not feature at all in the top ten resettlement caseloads whereas the largest resettlement 
caseload (the Bhutanese) is from a numerically small community.86
Bulgaria announced that the priority groups of its resettlement pilot programme would be Afghan 
and Iraqi refugees from Turkey,
  
87
In Ireland, the preference is for group resettlement, particularly if there are five or more families from 
the same region where they can be a self supporting group. ‘Group resettlement allows us to place the 
refugees outside of the Capital in smaller communities without the risk of isolation. We tend to resettle 
individual cases in Dublin or Cork where they may find members of their own community. From an 
economy of scale point of view, group resettlement allows for the provision of a centralised reception, 
orientation and language training programmes post arrival to prepare the group for independent living. 
Service providers will be more inclined to engage in preparation activities for groups.’
 which appear among the 2013 priority groups of the amended ERF. 
The financial incentive provided by the ERF evidently influences some Member States’ contribution 
to group resettlement. 
88
                                                     
82 See Know Reset graph here 
 
http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00693 
83 Petr Novak, Know Reset Final conference, op.cit. 
84 Written interview with Janneke van Etten, Senior Policy Officer at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, Migration Policy Department, Asylum, Reception and Return. Answers provided in consultation with the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Central Body for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, April 2012. 
85 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. 
86 Ibid p.24 
87 Interview with Anna Andreeva, Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, February 2012. 
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In contrast, France does not currently want to engage in group resettlement. Indeed, a commitment 
such would imply a commitment in terms of capacity that France says it does not have.89 Moreover, it 
decided not to respond to the UNHCR special Call for North Africa and explained to the European 
Commission that the reason was the “generosity” of France for the plight of refugees in the world as 
evidenced by the high number of asylum seekers.90
Geographical/National Origin and Regional Protection Programmes 
 
Member States may have some preferences in selecting refugees from particular countries of origin or 
of first asylum. The preference for some national origin can be dictated by a search for continuity in 
the foreign communities already present in the receiving country. Some Member States believe that a 
sustained concentration of resettlement and reception on a  particular group improves integration 
potential. In other words, if a State continues to resettle from the same group then an existing 
community is ready to welcome newly resettled refugees of that same group. Some Member States, 
like Portugal, favour a continuity in the origin of the refugees to be resettled. In Finland, the annual 
geographical allocation of the quota is also based on the need of continuity in the chosen refugee 
groups. France prioritized cases that have links with France or knowledge of French in the Iraq 500 
and EU relocation schemes – even if, in practice, NGOs did not notice that these refugees had specific 
links with France.  
Then, the selection of refugees hosted in some countries of first asylum can be influenced by the 
development of Regional Protection Programmes (RRPs). The 2005 Communication which provided 
for RPPs91 set out that RPPs should be brought forward with the intention of enhancing the protection 
capacity of the regions involved and better protecting the refugee population by providing durable 
solutions, one of which is resettlement. The Communication stated that the resettlement of refugees 
from countries covered by an RPP to EU Member States was seen as an important factor in 
demonstrating the partnership element of RPPs to third countries.92 Since that 2005 Communication, 
RPPs have continued to be an important element in how the EU has approached resettlement. RPPs 
were again central to the landmark establishment of JEURP in 2009.93 That Commission 
Communication stated that in RPPs which will be developed in the future, ‘resettlement should be 
more effectively incorporated and its implementation should be closely monitored.’94
The UK’s regional preferences are influenced by the situation of the RPP.
 The Council and 
Parliament’s Decision in 2013 on the EU’s resettlement priorities for 2013 further underlines the 
continued influence of RPPs in how the EU resettles. 
95 This is also the case for 
Belgium96
Resettlement countries wish to favour the integration of the resettled refugees, not only at the post-
arrival stage with integration tools but through selection. This can be done through opting for 
continuity in chosen groups, or through choosing certain UNHCR categories like women-at-risk and 
unaccompanied minors, who might be more expensive in a financial sense but are also more easily 
inserted into the receiving society.  
 and Portugal as additional European funding is available if resettlement takes place from a 
country/region where a Regional Protection Programme is in place.  
                                                     
89 Matthieu Tardis, 31 May 2013, op.cit. 
90 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
91 COM(2005) 388 final. 
92 Page 4, paragraph 7. 
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94 Page 10. 
95 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
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UNHCR Submission Categories and EU Priority Funding 
The role of European funding in targetting the categories of refugees to be resettled may be 
determinative in some Member States. In Portugal, the selection criteria for 2008-2013 followed the 
categories identified in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the ERF. Cases accepted by the Government have 
been routed, so far, in legal or physical protection needs and in the absence of local integration 
prospects in the first country of asylum.97
While a recent research paper was wondering: ‘Why is it that the acceptance rate of submissions 
relating to women, children and adolescents at risk has the lowest acceptance rates when it can easily 
be argued these are some of the most vulnerable refugees?,’
 
98
Belgium prioritized Palestinians and women-at-risk in 2009. In 2011, i t favoured families with 
children and single women. The UK also decided on the resettlement of a small percentage for 
medical cases and a h igher percentage for women-at-risk.
 this category of vulnerable refugees has 
been prioritised by several Member States and has also been prioritised by the ERF. 
99 Most Iraqi refugees arriving in the UK 
through the GPP between the end of 2008 a nd 2010 were families, in addition to some cases of 
women-at-risk.100 There are no so-called “important target groups” to be found in the Dutch policy, 
these depend on the mission destinations and as such can change on an annual basis. However, persons 
with traumatic experiences (victims of violence or torture), women “at risk” and persons with serious 
medical conditions do receive special attention.101 Similarly, for France, protection needs are the main 
criteria for the Ministry and more particularly the lack of protection and integration prospects in the 
country of first asylum. Vulnerable groups such as women and children at risk, victims of violence and 
medical needs are prioritised.102
The proportion of resettled women (not only at risk) seems to be higher than the proportion of men, 
This is also the case in the refugee population as a whole in at least in five EU Member States where 
the information has been made available. In Belgium, women have accounted for 79% of the total of 
resettled people over the past decade. This figure stands at 60% in Portugal, 55% in Germany, 53% in 
Romania and 51% in the UK.
  
103
In contrast, some categories of vulnerable persons, like elderly persons, may be deemed unlikely to 
integrate and therefore may not be accepted for resettlement. This is the case in Ireland. ‘In the past a 
small number of unaccompanied older persons were accepted and while their safety and security was 
taken care of they were very isolated and lonely.’ Rather, ‘many older people are admitted as a part of 




‘Likewise, in general, cases with serious mental health issues are not accepted. This is due to 
difficulties accessing appropriate services in the Irish Mental Health sector. Issues arise as many of the 
cases referred through resettlement have minority languages and it can be difficult to provide services 
through an interpreter that is not specifically trained to interpret in a mental health environment. 
Therefore, in the best interests of the applicant we do not accept persons with serious mental health 
  
                                                     
97 Interview with Internal Affairs, Portugal, op.cit. 
98 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.28. The same report actually notes that since 2006
 
there has been a 
renewed focus on women and girls at risk. 
99 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
100 10,000 Refugees from Iraq, A report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union, op.cit., p.26. 
101 Interview with the Dutch Ministry of Interior, op.cit. 
102 Presentation of the Head of the Asylum Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to a seminar on resettlement organised 
by France terre d’asile in June 2011, reported by Matthieu Tardis during his interview, op.cit. 
103 See the Know Reset graph here http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00691 
104 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit.  
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issues.’105 In France too, authorities and social workers are making a l ink between the selection 
criteria, and the refugees’ integration. Namely, they consider that vulnerable refugees (medical cases, 
aging refugees) are more difficult to accommodate and to integrate.106
Unlike the other Nordic countries, Sweden does not have special provisions for special categories 
like urgent medical cases.
 
107 Sweden prioritises maximum flexibility in filling the quota. It considers 
that, if a specific number of places is established for women for example then one has to deny places 
to this category after the ceiling has been reached. Moreover, if there are fixed places for a category 
e.g. unaccompanied minors, it can be difficult to find places for this category in municipalities.108
Strategies designed far in advance of programme resettlement can result in certain difficulties in 
responding to emergency situations. When a crisis develops, such as the situation that occurred when 
resettlement was urgently required for large numbers of refugees who had fled to Egypt and Tunisia 
from Libya in 2011, the response was extremely slow. On a macro level, it is relevant to note that 
during 2011, only 72.7%
 
of cases that the UNHCR had submitted to Member States and that were 
deemed as having “emergency priority,” were accepted. This compares to 86.1% of the ”urgent 
priority” cases and 94.1% of the “normal priority” cases and reflects a situation where refugees with 
relatively lower protection needs have a greater chance of being resettled in a timely manner.
  
109
Some Member States allocate part of their quota for urgent and emergency cases, like Sweden (350 
places). Other countries such as I reland do not have a r eserved number of places for emergency 
resettlements, such cases are included in the quota. The UK, for its part, does not support the 
resettlement of refugees in emergency situations and argues that its policy is to provide help and 
advice in alleviating the situation in situ.
  
110
Some Member States resettle specific categories of refugees, independently of UNHCR and the EU 
priorities. Sweden for instance has an agreement with the International Criminal Court in The Hague 
to offer resettlement to Tribunal witnesses and their family members. 
 It considers that resettlement programmes are aimed at 
relieving the burden of refugees in protracted situations where resettlement is the only viable solution.  
Denmark agreed in 2007 to resettle Iraqis, following an initiative by Danish soldiers in Iraq. It 
decided to resettle Iraqis who had formerly worked for the Danish Coalition forces in response to 
reports that the safety of a number of employees and their families was threatened because of their 
association with the troops. The decision to resettle preceded the withdrawal of Danish troops by 
approximately one month. International media sources reported that two hundred Iraqi aides and 
translators were secretly airlifted out of the southern region of Basra in July 2007. Likewise, in 2007, 
the British government began to resettle Iraqis that were formally locally employed (LE) with the 
British Armed Forces or civilian missions. The UK decided to reserve 600 of  the 1,000 places 
allocated for Iraqis from the end of 2008 to March 2010 to LE and their dependants, provided they 
meet the UK resettlement programme criteria. The UK government stopped accepting LE Iraqi 
applications for resettlement in May 2009; although not all of those who were accepted had arrived. A 
smaller number of Iraqis, who were not former employees of the British Forces in Iraq, have been 
accepted for resettlement based on referrals from the UNHCR. In 2013, the UK announced the same 
priority for former locally-engaged staff in Afghanistan111
                                                     
105 Ibid. 
.  
106 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
107 Interview with Oskar Ekblad, op.cit. 
108 Phone interview with the Swedish Ministry of Justice, Division for Migration and Asylum Policy, 30 March 2012. 
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110 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
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National preferences for certain refugee categories, when they do not compete, can be 
complementary. From 2008, when refugees having fled from Iraq were resettled in EU Member 
States, some Member States opted to resettle Palestinians while others preferred Iraqis, most of the 
time on the basis of a pre-existing community in the country. The UK and Italy made Palestinians a 
resettlement priority in 2009, while Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal have not integrated 
Palestinians into their ad hoc or quota resettlement programmes for Iraqi refugees. 
The objective of having a concerted approach to resettlement in the EU should not necessarily be to 
have the same targets in all the Member States, except when a group situation urgently needs to be 
resolved. Currently, despite the apparent diversity in selection criteria, there is a c ertain amount of 
common ground in relation to profile restrictions, which results in “competition” for the favoured 
caseloads while those in the excluded groups can be left out in the cold.112
The ‘Integration Potential’: A Criteria for Refugees or for the receiving society? 
 This situation is partly due 
to resettlement states’ focus on the ‘integration potential’ of refugees. 
One important consideration is the introduction of the so-called integration potential criteria into the 
selection process. It has been adopted by the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, 
France, Germany, Slovenia. In Romania, the potential for integration was applied in 2008, but dropped 
in 2012 in the revised resettlement programme after discussions with the UNHCR. Denmark has even 
incorporated the integration potential criteria into legislation and
 
added supplementary criteria of 
influence: language qualifications, education and work experience, social network, age, motivation.113
Actually, several Member States which have committed to resettlement, expect a return on their 
investment. In Spain for instance, ‘the incentives could be to obtain some form of compensation for the 
participation in European Resettlement programmes, financial compensation alone would not be 
enough because these programmes should be co-financed by each EU Member State. Perhaps the 
selection of highly qualified/skilled persons who would be more likely to integrate into Spanish society 
may positively determine an eventual decision to resettle. The most important factors may include the 
necessity to obtain skilled workers suitable for the labour market of each country, as well as a profile 
of resettled people who won’t run up excessive expenses in the health care or social system of EU 
Member States.’
 
The Dutch Minister for Immigration and Asylum recently proposed to the UNHCR that they select 
higher profile refugees such as human rights activists and academics. 
114
This is a reminder of resettlement policy after WWII, as ex plained by Sweden: ‘Resettlement in 
Sweden started in 1950, when the first annual refugee quota was set. To begin with, the Swedish refugee 
quota was a contribution to the international ambitions to empty the refugee camps in Europe after the 
Second World War. At the time, Sweden also suffered a labour shortage. In fact, nine out of ten of the 
collective transferred refugees between 1950 and until mid-1970's were of working age and able-bodied. 
Sweden's resettlement activities have since taken a humanitarian direction.’
 
115 Today, Sweden does not 
use integration criteria, and ‘believes that the integration element can be evaluated in cases of labour 
migration but not in the case of refugees, where the need for protection should be decisive.’116
 
 
                                                     
112 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.13. 
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While basing the selection of refugees on criteria that is supposed to favour integration rather than 
vulnerability is problematic, the frontier between both considerations can be tiny. In 2008, Germany 
was considering helping Iraqi refugees suffering religious persecution and sought specific measures to 
help Christian Iraqis. Since the Christians were persecuted because of their religion, governments 
easily argue that the reason for their selection was their particular vulnerability. Yet, choosing 
Christians instead of Muslims may also be motivated by some EU Member States’ wish to limit the 
reception of a culture deemed to be a threat to the main culture of the country. In 2008, after much 
internal and external debate and negotiation involving UNHCR and the EU, Germany agreed to admit 
not only refugees from persecuted minorities but also vulnerable refugees with specific medical needs 
and female headed-households.117 Likewise, in France, the Iraq 500 programme was adopted by the 
President of the French Republic after a visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Iraq and his meeting 
with a h igh representative of the Chaldean Catholic Church there in 2007. The scheme was first 
dedicated only to Christian Iraqis. Some organisations, including France terre d’asile, protested against 
the scope of this humanitarian programme and underlined the contradiction between, on the one hand, 
the target of the programme and, on t he other hand, the principle of secularism and the protection 
grounds. Finally, the programme was opened to all “persecuted minorities.”118
A specific situation that seems to particularly impact upon Eastern European countries is that most 
of them argue that refugees do not want to be resettled in their countries. Bulgarian experience with 
relocation, considered as a test for further resettlement, revealed that no refugee in Malta was ready to 
go to Bulgaria.
  
119 The refugees resettled in Romania in 2009 are said to have left the country after they 
received a residence permit. ‘The group of 38 refugees resettled in Romania were extremely unhappy 
about their current situation and what they felt was a dire socio-economic condition compared to their 
lives in Malaysia, where there were plenty of jobs and good wages (…) The refugees claimed they had 
been given confusing information about their new home country by the Romanian authorities and 
UNHCR during the cultural orientation course prior to their departure. They criticized Romania for 
not being a good resettlement country and demanded that the UNHCR send them to the USA or a 
Nordic country.’120
In Italy too, the Palestinian refugees resettled in Riace fled to Norway, where they are said to have 
received a more attractive social package and would have better socio-economic opportunities.
 Hungary had a si milar experience. In 2007, i t provided refuge to 29 C uban 
nationals who were living on the US base in Guantanamo. The majority of the refugees had already 
left Hungary only a few months after arrival and settled down in Spain. Hungary has also participated 
in the EU relocation pilot project in Malta (EUREMA). The relocated couple spent only three days in 
Hungary before returning to Malta. Having assessed the reception conditions actually offered by 
Hungary the relocated couple found that they were not given what had been promised to them.  
121
These countries actually share several gaps in their integration capacity and probably a lack of 
qualified resettlement/relocation planning that takes place before the arrival of the resettled/relocated 
 
They were then brought back to Italy even though they were not brought back to Riace but were 
reinserted in other reception facilities in Italy. Italy considers that it is the lack of money available 
which led to the Palestinians leaving the country. 
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refugees.122 Most of all, they share a p roblem of “managing refugees’ expectations” which is also 
underlined in France123
The 2012 D ecision in Romania, which dropped the integration potential criteria, nevertheless 
requires refugees to express their consent to be resettled in Romania before being moved there. This 
option is the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the Romanian State as to the reasons why 
refugees leave the country post resettlement and as to the purpose of resettlement in the first place. 
The decision suggests that refugees should be grateful to be resettled in the EU, regardless of the 
situation that they find themselves in once they have been resettled. If there was better information as 
to the reception conditions available and as to life in the receiving country then expectations would be 
more realistic.
 despite the better integration capacity available there. 
124
Besides, ‘resettlement should not be about what the entrants can do for a country but more about 
what the country can do for them. The raison d’ȇtre for resettlement is and always should be 
protection. (…) Who is to say that people determined not to possess “integration potential” will not 
settle well? There is ample evidence that this need not necessarily be the case – providing refugees are 
given the right sort of assistance.’
 
125
In selecting refugees for resettlement, the UNHCR urges countries not to use integration potential 
and other discriminatory criteria (e.g. family size, age, health status, ethnicity and religion). Such 
discrimination undermines the protection and needs-based approach to resettlement, creating 
inequalities and protection gaps, and limits access to resettlement for some of the refugees who are 
most at risk. The integration of refugees in a country of resettlement is therefore a sep arate 
consideration, which involves the refugees’ adaptation and active participation in the new society.
 Resettling governments that focus on the ‘integration potential’ 
of refugees justify their position by claiming that it makes it easier to provide services and that 
integration will be more successful. These criteria, however, are hard to meet for displaced persons 
who were born in camps or who have been living there for a long time. They are also likely to rule out 
some of the most vulnerable refugees. 
126
Recently, the UNHCR has called for the resettlement of 2,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2013. 
People with serious medical needs and the disabled are set as being resettlement priorities by the 
UNHCR.
 
127 The UNHCR announced that it will discuss the selection with each resettlement country 
to avoid the application of discriminating criteria such as religion. It has called the resettlement 
countries to be flexible in their selection criteria.128
‘Instead of discussing the integration potential of refugees it might be useful to move forward to a 
focus on the integration capacity of (the receiving country). This way, the responsibility rests on the 




Yet, as stated above, the more EU Member States that are open to flexibility in selecting refugees, 
the more those States may provide flexibility in the status and rights granted to refugees. Indeed, 
recent resettlement experiences have led to the resettled persons being granted a temporary protection 
and rights that are not similar to those offered with the refugee status. 
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125 Refugee Resettlement: 2012 and Beyond, op.cit. p.23. 
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3.2 Diversity in Status and Rights Granted130
According to the UNHCR, resettlement involves ‘the selection and transfer of refugees from one state 
in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – 
with permanent residence status. The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and 
provides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights similar to those 
enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a 
naturalised citizen of the resettlement country.’
 
131
The ERF has voiced support for this set of objectives. According to the Decisions establishing the 
ERF III ( 2008-2013), an action is considered a resettlement and only funded as such if the persons 
transferred from a t hird country to a Mem ber State are permitted to reside with refugee status.
 
132
This means that granting subsidiary protection or another status on the basis of national law would 
not preclude an ERF support if this status grants the same rights as refugee status. 
 
Alternatively, a status which offers the same rights and benefits under national and Community law as 
refugee status may be awarded. 
The EU law and accordingly national laws in the EU Member States, stipulate that two forms of 
protection can be granted: refugee status and the subsidiary protection. In most of EU Member States, 
the rights attached to the refugee status are different from those granted with the subsidiary protection. 
Moreover, the rights attached to both statuses vary from one Member State to another. 
While all EU Member states may grant the refugee status to resettled refugees, some of them may 
instead only grant a subsidiary protection to part of them. This is the case in the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
This is not always applied in conformity to national law. The Polish Act foresees that resettlement 
applies both to persons meeting the requirements of refugee status and of subsidiary protection – and 
leads to one of those statuses - like most of the Member States. In contrast, the Hungarian law, like 
Spanish law 12/2009, only mentions refugee status as regards resettlement: ‘Refugees who are resettled 
in Spain will have the same status as refugees who are recognised as such under the provisions of this 
Law.’ Yet, among the 80 refugees resettled from Tunisia to Spain in 2012, 74 w ere granted subsidiary 
protection, only four received refugee status and two were family reunifications. The impact on the right 
of residence is significant, as a refugee receives a five-year residence permit in Spain while a person who 
has received the subsidiary protection will only receive a one-year stay permit. 
In many Member States, the rights attached to refugee status differ from those granted with the 
subsidiary protection. The Portuguese Asylum and International Protection Law (Law 27/2008 of June 
30) issues residence permits for refugee status for five years, renewable for similar periods, and 
residence permits for subsidiary protection are issued for a minimum of 2 years, renewable for similar 
periods. In Italy, subsidiary protection leads to a three-year stay permit, instead of a five-year 
residence permit for a refugee. It is in France that the difference between residence permits are best 
highlighted, refugees receive a ten-year residence permit and a beneficiary of the subsidiary protection 
receives a one-year residence permit. 
Granting status that is different from refugee status does not necessarily mean that the resettled 
person is only temporarily protected. Those who are resettled in Sweden are divided into three 
categories and may be granted one of the following statuses: (i) convention refugees (ii) persons in 
need of subsidiary protection or (iii) individuals “otherwise in need of protection.” Yet, they all 
                                                     
130 For an exhaustive comparison of the status and rights granted to resettled refugees in the EU, see the country profiles of 
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receive a permanent residence permit before arriving in Sweden, whatever their status.133
The ERF’s financial incentive can clearly orientate the decision. This was the case for Belgium in 
2009 and 2011: ‘Amongst others because of the funding regulations of the ERF, refugee status must be 
granted in Belgium and as such, persons who are only eligible for subsidiary protection are excluded. 
In the future, expanding to include subsidiary protection could be considered, including the relevant 
criteria, or potentially the development of a completely parallel resettlement procedure with its own 
criteria and a status sui generis.’
 A right to 
permanent residence, in conformity with the UNHCR’s standard, is also provided in Belgium and in 
the UK. In most of Member States, the residence permit is time-limited but renewable, and in some of 
them, it is common to all resettled persons, whatever their status. This is the case in Denmark and 
Finland, which grant a four-year stay permit to resettled persons. The Netherlands deliver a five-year 
residence permit, which then leads to a right to permanent residence. In Romania, the law stipulates 
that resettled persons ‘will have the same rights and obligations in Romania as the refugees 
recognized by the Romanian State’ (Art. 3(5)). 
134
This is already happening in Ireland, where resettled persons have a specific status, the ‘programme 
refugee,’ which provides similar rights to those offered to the refugees, but also some specific rights, 
such as some facilities for family reunification. Under the current Irish resettlement programme, 
members of the family are dealt with in two ways. Immediate family members are included in the 
quota. Therefore when an application is examined, care is taken to ensure that all of the nuclear family 
members are considered together at the time of application. The admission of any other family 
members such as siblings of the applicant, are at the discretion of the Minister. Should an applicant 
decide to omit a member of the nuclear family at the time of application, and then seek to be reunited 
with that family member at a later date, this type of application would be at the discretion of the 
Minister. The definition of “family member” for resettlement purposes, which includes unmarried 
children over the age of 18 years, is broader than the definition of “family Member” in the Refugee 
Act 1996, as amended. This avoids a situation where the act of resettlement actually results in other 
family members becoming “vulnerable” in their current environment and reduces the number of 
family reunification applications later.
  
135
In contrast, resettled persons in Germany have less rights in terms of family reunification than 
those of the refugees, which may inhibit the integration of the refugees. This is a reason why the 
country has been criticised by some stakeholders, despite Germany’s recent significant commitments 
in refugee resettlement. The national legislation for the future resettlement programme will be the 
same as for the ad hoc resettlement of Iraqi refugees in 2009/2010, which does not provide a refugee 
protection status. The resettled refugees will receive temporary three-year residence permits, 
renewable where deemed necessary. After seven years, provided the applicant meets the relevant 
requirements, a settlement permit may be granted. 
  
Some recent changes in some Member States have tended to favour the integration of resettled 
persons. They concern the placement upon arrival. The placement in camps may postpone or even 
impede integration prospects.136
                                                     
133 Interview with Oskar Ekblad, op.cit. 
 France has therefore decided that resettled persons would now be 
134 Interview with Ewout Adriaens, op.cit. 
135 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
136 An illustration with the reception conditions in Hungary: ‘As for reception conditions in general, refugees and beneficiaries 
of subsidiary protection are accommodated in the open OIN integration facility in Bicske (…). The present system has 
proven to be ineffective in equipping beneficiaries of international protection with the skills required for integration. Living 
in Bicske for up to one year keeps people isolated from the local community. Most of the residents do not have any contacts 
with Hungarian people except for the social workers. They often do not have any other ties to people living outside the camp 
who could ease their integration into the society. This also slows their process of learning the language and how different 
institutions and services operate. After having lived in Bicske for 6 months most of the refugees do not dispose of the features 
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placed in houses.137 This important reform nevertheless prolongs the resettlement process as the 
reception of refugees is decided as and when houses are getting available. A recent change has also 
taken place in the Dutch resettlement policy, aimed at the direct placement of refugees in the 
municipalities. From the moment of selection of the refugee that is to be resettled, contact is made 
with local and regional authorities in relation to the preparation for housing and support.138
For Hungary, ‘a positive Finnish experience was not to try integration in the capital, but in a 
smaller place, where local community can take a part in the integration. The families or groups this 
way integrate really in the society and not in their local diaspora, from which they might have wanted 
to detach anyways.’
  
139 This interpretation goes against the Irish experience for instance. As mentioned 
above, resettlement is organised in such a way that the refugees can be in contact and maintain the link 
with their fellow nationals. Individual cases are generally resettled in the greater Dublin area while 
groups are resettled in smaller places. In addition, ‘one thing unique about the Irish programme is that 
the Resettlement Unit, Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration provide direct support to 
individual cases resettled in Dublin while local authorities and NGO’s provide direct support services 
for those resettled outside of the Capital. This keeps the National Coordinating team in touch with the 
day to day issues arising and helps us to understand the challenges faced by both the refugees and the 
service providers. Each year the learning informs the process for the coming year. The country is also 
smaller than most EU Member States.’140
The support and monitoring of refugees by service providers are indeed essential for refugees. In 
Italy, the placement in individual houses did not favour the integration of the resettled refugees since 
they were situated in uninhabited areas with no public transportation facilities. Isolation and the lack 
of employment perspectives led to a number of resettled persons leaving Italy. 
 
In most Member States, the resettled persons get permission to work and access to all social 
benefits. Yet, even in countries where the resettlement experience is described as a success, like in the 
UK or in Ireland, a low level of employment and of economic independence among the refugees has 
been noted.141
A growing concern applies to the possible development of a lower reception quality, which may be 
a result of a greater number of places being available for resettlement. The UK for instance aspires to 
increase its quota of 1,000 refugees per year when this becomes affordable, but ‘the present fiscal 
climate suggests that additional money for resettlement is unlikely in the near future and the focus will 
need to be either: increased funding from Europe; or reducing the levels of support and 
accommodation to refugees in order to increase the numbers resettled within the existing budget.’
  
142
Does accepting a greater number of refugees necessarily mean offering less rights?  
  
The UNHCR itself has had to call for temporary shelter in order to get more resettlement States to 
respond to major refugee crises. Apart from calling for the durable resettlement of 2,000 Syrian 
refugees -who do not appear among the priority groups of the EU as listed for 2013 and as proposed 
(Contd.)                                                                  
– detailed knowledge on employment conditions, satisfactory health condition, own financial resources, language etc. – that 
are needed for finding employment. After being released from Bicske, refugees do not have any realistic prospects on access 
to accommodation or employment. Access to language courses is also of great concern. As a result, some refugees opt to 
move to other EU Member States, upon recognition of their refugee status. If returned to Hungary, they often become 
homeless. Homeless refugees reportedly face various violations of their physical integrity, with single women and the 
vulnerable particularly at risk’. Interview with UNHCR Hungary, April 2012 
137 Matthieu Tardis, 31 May 2013, op.cit. 
138 Interview with the Dutch Ministry of Interior, op.cit. 
139 Interview with the Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), April 2012. 
140 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
141 Interviews with Dave Atkinson and Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
142 Interview with Dave Atkinson, op.cit. 
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for the future AMF (Asylum and Migration Fund) - it also called for the ‘humanitarian’ temporary 
reception of 10,000 S yrian refugees in 2013. Germany responded to the call by offering to receive 
5,000 Syrians, some of whom already have family links with Germany. This valuable German 
contribution to protecting refugees and alleviating the effort of the countries of first asylum is double 
the number of refugees that Germany resettled during the Iraqi refugee crisis five years ago. In terms 
of protection however, this contribution may be more comparable to the temporary protection granted 
during the Kosovo war in 1999, and is therefore linked to the hope of a rapid return of Syrian refugees 
to their country of origin – which appears to be unlikely, given the current situation there. 
While the integration of refugees in general and resettled refugees in particular, has become the 
focus of the UNHCR together with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involved in the 
field, opting for the temporary protection of refugees in situations which call for durable solutions may 
raise additional difficulties both for refugees and the receiving societies. 
‘Resettlement is a process which only begins with the transfer of a refugee and her/his family and 
dependants to a new country. Just as with the other durable solutions, integration is thus essential 
to the durability of resettlement. UNHCR only supports the resettlement of further persons of 
concern once there is a proven system in place addressing in a comprehensive manner a reception 
and integration system. The status provided in the country of resettlement should provide a 
resettled refugee and her/his family and dependants with a durable solution: integration requires 
the receiving country to ensure that refugees have access to resources required for their longer 
term stability and adjustment to the new society, while fostering a sense of belonging and 
participation.’143
4. Responsibility-Sharing and the Resettlement/Relocation Dichotomy 
 
This report has already established that a considerable revolution has occurred in the approach taken 
by the EU and its Member States toward resettlement over the course of the past ten years. However, 
in the past few years a parallel system has emerged which has, at times, overlapped and at other times 
been obvious in its differences. That parallel system of ‘intra-EU resettlement’ is most commonly 
referred to as relocation. 
Resettlement has already been set out above in a quote from the UNHCR as being "the selection 
and transfer of refugees from one state in which they have sought protection to a third state which 
has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent residence status."144 In the EU, it should be 
added that that third State must be the country of first asylum which is not a Member State of the 
EU. Relocation on t he other hand refers to the transfer of persons from one Member State to 
another. A Commission Communication from 2009 s ets out a further explanation as to what 
resettlement is and also provides an explanation as to relocation. Resettlement is a h umanitarian 
exercise concerned with solidarity with third countries i.e. those States which are not Member States 
of the EU.145 Relocation on the other hand is a 'burden sharing' exercise, the purpose of which is to 
share the responsibility of receiving refugees among Member States of the EU. Thus, relocation is 
concerned with intra-EU solidarity.146
 
  
                                                     
143 Interview with UNHCR Hungary, op.cit. 
144 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 2011, p.3 
145 Based on t he wording of the Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme. Page 3. See:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0447:EN:NOT 
146 Based on t he wording of the Commission communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Establishment of a joint EU resettlement Programme. Page 3. See :  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0447:EN:NOT 
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4.1 The Emergence of Relocation 
The intra-EU solidarity which led to relocation can be traced back to the intense strain on southern 
Member States in dealing with mass arrivals of irregular migrants. In 2009, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
Malta adopted what is now commonly known as the Quattro Paper147. This was a document 
highlighting these Member States’ concerns with their asylum and migration situations, coupled with a 
list of recommendations primarily addressed to the EU. On 19th April 2011, the same EU Member 
States together with Spain adopted a Joint Communiqué, which reiterated their concerns in relation to 
the flows of migrants and asylum-seekers reaching their territory and calling the EU for 
‘responsibility-sharing’ among the Member States148
The European Council Conclusions of June 2009 called for the coordination of voluntary measures 
for internal reallocation of beneficiaries of international protection present in the Member States 
exposed to specific and disproportionate pressures, starting with a pilot project for Malta. This project, 
called EUREMA for European Relocation Malta, targeted a total of 255 beneficiaries of international 
protection hosted in Malta. France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and the UK joined the initiative to re-allocate beneficiaries with a view to 
integrating them in their respective societies
. Those southern States made multiple requests 
for assistance from the Commission and their EU partners and have spoken in favour of relocating 
refugees from their territories.  
149
In April 2011, the European Commission decided to extent the project (EUREMA II). The 
programme is set to run from the beginning of 2012 until the end of 2013. To bolster uptake for 
EUREMA, the EU made financial assistance from the European Refugee Fund available to both 
resettlement and relocation. This report has already considered how influential ERF funding can be as 
an incentive to resettle or not to resettle. It is certainly also the case with regard to relocation. 
. 
While the first EUREMA project was a pilot experiment in relocation, the second EUREMA can be 
seen as being a response to a specific crisis. On the 12 May 2011, the European Commission organised a 
Ministerial pledging conference for relocation of migrants from Malta and resettlement of migrants from 
North Africa. Commissioner Malmström stated that ‘The situation is very serious in both North Africa 
and in Malta’ and hailed the positive response from Member States as a sh ow of solidarity both in an 
intra-Member State sense and also in the sense of solidarity with international partners150
Participation in EUREMA was considerable. Several Member States pledged their assistance, 
including Germany, Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Hungary and Bulgaria as well as Associated States such as Norway, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein with a total pledge for 356 persons. Whilst some countries have chosen to conduct 
relocation on a bilateral level, other Member States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and Slovakia) are participating in the EUREMA II project, for EU financing under the 
European Refugee Fund, Community Actions 2011
.  
151
The overwhelming reason given for uptake was to express solidarity with their fellow Member 
States that were under a particular strain from mass arrivals at the southern borders.’
. 
152




148 See EASO Monitor, http://easomonitor.blogspot.fr/2011/04/southern-eu-ms-publish-joint-communique.html 
149 See the website of the Maltese Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, http://mhas.gov.mt/en/MHAS-
Information/EUREMA/Pages/EUREMA-I.aspx 
150 See her statement on 13 May 2011, Memo 11/295, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-295_en.htm?locale=fr 
151 http://mhas.gov.mt/en/MHAS-Information/EUREMA/Pages/EUREMA-II.aspx 
152 The EASO fact-finding report on intra-EU relocation activities from Malta stated that a number of Member States said 
that relocation was a co ncrete example of intra-Member State solidarity: http://easo.europa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-finding-report-EASO1.pdf  
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explanation was particularly strong among the newer Member States which are also eager to 
participate to intra-EU solidarity and show by this way their commitment in EU affairs. Certain among 
the newer accession States have supported relocation while ignoring any call for resettlement. The 
feeling that it is more important to show solidarity with States which are partners within the EU than 
with those States outside of the Union, is tangible. Finally, relocation has also been considered by 
some potential resettlement countries as a testing ground for the future resettlement of refugees, as was 
the case with Bulgaria.153
Some EU Member States support both relocation and resettlement - Bulgaria; Denmark: France; 
Germany; Hungary; Ireland; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Spain. There are States which support resettlement but not relocation - Belgium; Czech 
Republic; Finland; Italy; Sweden; UK. One State supports relocation but not resettlement - Lithuania. 
Finally, there is also the States which have not voiced a strong preference or support for either 
resettlement or relocation: Austria; Cyprus; Estonia; Greece; Latvia; Malta. 
  
The key question considering the merits of relocation must be whether or not relocation is been 
done to the detriment of resettlement. The question relates to the potential and actual overlaps that has 
occurred between the two terms. 
4.2 The Distinction between Relocation and Resettlement 
This section examines the potential overlap between the distinct strategies of refugee protection – 
relocation and resettlement. Relocation and resettlement can quite easily be distinguished by 
considering the circumstances in which a refugee is transferred to a Member State. If that refugee is 
moved from a country of first asylum beyond the borders of EU Member States then that transfer is a 
resettlement. If a refugee has already reached the EU and is transferred from one Member State to 
another then that transfer is relocation.  
The distinction therefore is extremely simple but nevertheless, there has been a certain overlap and 
confusion between the terms. The danger is that relocation is used instead of resettlement. 
Resettlement has a protection focus. Taking refugees from a co untry of first asylum is focussing 
efforts upon the most vulnerable of refugees. Relocating refugees from one Member State to another is 
effectively transferring a refugee within an area which should have a uniform protection for refugees 
anyway. Conducting relocation in place of resettlement therefore takes the protection focus away. The 
choice for Member States may be expressed in terms of solidarity. Resettlement has been conducted to 
express solidarity with international partners while relocation is carried out on the basis of intra-EU 
solidarity. Member States are faced with the choice of expressing solidarity with their partners on the 
EU level (relocation) or with third States (resettlement). The choice of Member States and indeed 
other important stakeholders, has confirmed that relocation and resettlement both suffer from certain 
overlap and a lack of clarity with regard to the distinction between them.  
Slovakia for instance does not clearly distinguish between resettlement and relocation. It often 
refers to both terms by using its Slovak equivalent “presídľovanie” or “presídlenie,” both meaning 
resettlement. However, for relocation it would be preferable to use term “relokácia.” The Slovak 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Solidarity with other Member States was the categorical reason given to Know Reset for relocation by many Member States, 
see for example: Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania. 
153 In May 2011, the Interior Minister Tsvetan Svetanov announced that Bulgaria would be accepting two to four North 
African refugees from Italy. The Minister stated that this relocation should be considered as an act of solidarity with Italy 
which was experiencing an influx of irregular migrants at that time and also as a training ground for future resettlement. 
See: The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Iliana Savova, “Do We Have a Quota on Humaneness”, 
http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/publications/obektiv/iliana-savova/2011-08/do-we-have-quota-humaneness  
However, despite the Bulgarian pledge for relocation, no persons decided to relocate to Bulgaria. Anna Andreeva, Know 
Reset Final Conference, op.cit. 
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Ministry of Interior’s website refers to the EUREMA project as a project aimed at the resettlement of 
persons within the EU. Slovakia did plan on participating in resettlement under the 2010 ERF annual 
programme; however, due to Slovakia’s involvement in the pilot project of relocation from Malta, it 
was postponed under the annual programme of 2011.154
Ireland has relocated refugees from Malta. These refugees were categorised as being part of the 
programme resettlement quota which exists in Ireland.
 In this instance, priority was given to 
relocation over resettlement.  
155
Internal rules within Member States can in certain circumstances dictate that refugees must be 
regarded as being resettled rather than relocated. In 2007, refugees were transferred from Malta to 
Portugal. These people had not been granted international protection in Malta. If they had been 
granted international protection in Malta then the Portugese would have categorised them as having 
been relocated. The UNHCR had recognised them as refugees. The Portugese State then considered 
these refugees as being resettled refugees.
 Places which otherwise would have been 
taken by resettled refugees were thus taken by relocated refugees. The distinction between 
relocation and resettlement is not made in the context of the Irish resettlement quota. However, even 
when the distinction is made, resettlement numbers can be substituted for relocation. When a 
Spanish boat picked up fifty-one migrants who were found at sea between Libya and Malta in July 
2006, the Dutch resettlement quota, which is generally not used for relocation, was utilised. An 
emergency acute humanitarian situation existed and the Netherlands decided to accept five of the 
refugees for resettlement.  
156
These examples detail how the terms have overlapped among Member States implementing their 
refugee protection regimes. However, the overlap does not begin and end with Member States alone, 
other stakeholders have also met with some overlap. Take the example of the recent announcement by 
the German State that it was pledging five thousand places for refugees fleeing the conflict in Syria.
 Internal rules as to a refugee’s status pre-departure have 
therefore dictated what category that refugee fits into and the distinction between terms is not made on 
the basis of where the refugees are coming from. 
157 
In September of 2013, the UNHCR called that German pledge ‘…the biggest relocation programme in 
existence…’158 The UNHCR here referred to it as b eing relocation on the basis that those refugees 
were a “humanitarian admission” rather than, sensu stricto, resettlement.159
From the perspective of EU policymakers and refugee stakeholders, making the distinction remains 
a challenge. The EASO has already identified that challenge. The EASO’s fact finding report on 
relocation from Malta stated that ‘…concerns were expressed about the possible implication of 
relocation on the resettlement quotas in the EU. It was stressed that intra-EU relocation should not be 
confused with resettlement of refugees from third countries.’
 Most other Member 
States have chosen to resettle Syrians in response to the conflict. The German action is clearly not 
relocation in the sense outlined in this report. The UNHCR of course are free to define relocation in 
whatever terms it sees fit. What this reporting by the UNHCR does illustrate is that there is a lack of 
uniformity internationally as to how distinguish relocation from resettlement.  
160
                                                     
154 Please see the Slovakian country profile on the Know Reset website, available at:  
 That Agency, of course, has a limited 
mandate and cannot direct Member States as to how they should approach relocation and resettlement. 
http://www.know-reset.eu/files/texts/00166_20130919160632_knowresetcountryprofileslovakia.pdf 
155 Interview with Martina Glennon, op.cit. 
156 Written interview with the Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, 24 February 2012. 
157 See: http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00697 
158 See: http://www.unhcr.org/523076919.html 
159 See: http://www.know-reset.eu/?c=00715 
160 See page 16 of  the EASO Report, op.cit.: http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-finding-report-
EASO1.pdf 
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However, the EASO can take a r ole in raising awareness that these two protection strategies are 
distinct and should not be confused.  
4.3 Relocation as a Complement to Resettlement 
The last section underlined the wide variety of ways in which resettlement and relocation can overlap. 
This section seeks to emphasise that priority must be put on resettlement. While relocation can be a 
valuable tool in complementing resettlement, it should never replace resettlement. Relocation can 
complement resettlement by providing a support to Member States which are under a particular strain 
from mass arrivals and perhaps also do not have the reception and procedural conditions necessary to 
secure the appropriate protection for refugees. However, relocation’s complementary role should 
remain just that – complementary. The evidence suggests that relocation may have, on occasion, 
impacted upon the numbers of refugees being resettled from a country of first asylum, such 
interference in resettlement’s full potential in the EU cannot be allowed to occur. This section will first 
turn to consideration of problems of relocation as highlighted by Member States in the course of Know 
Reset’s research. It will then consider the approach of the EU as a collective before offering a 
concluding paragraph as to how relocation can accomplish its task as a co mplement to resettlement 
without interfering with the success of the EU’s resettlement regime. 
In Sweden, the Ministry for Justice stated that it is hesitant towards relocation and has assumed a 
‘wait-and-see’ attitude. Sweden clearly seems to see resettlement as having twin priorities which 
should not be compromised by relocation. Firstly, resettlement is seen as being a burden-sharing 
operation with States of first asylum.161 Secondly, the priority of providing protection to the most 
vulnerable refugees should always remain the focus. It is felt by Sweden that there is a big difference 
between resettling people from troubled countries and resettling them from a Member State where 
those people should already have a reasonable level of protection. Moreover, investing in relocation 
would probably mean that financial means are being redirected from resettlement to relocation. 
Sweden has voiced support for a proper evaluation study of the pro and cons of relocation before 
giving any consideration to committing to relocation. The Ministry further stated that one of the 
reasons for relocation put forward by countries like Malta and Italy is that the refugee pressure on 
them is too high, but looking at the statistics, the pressure on them is not stronger than that 
experienced in Sweden.162 The Netherlands added its voice to the Swedish view that it is important 
that Member States express solidarity with developing countries who receive large numbers of 
refugees.163 Many Member States find themselves in the position that relocation and intra-EU 
solidarity comes into conflict with this more international solidarity with countries of first asylum.164 
The argument could be extended that alternative measures of intra-EU solidarity exist and a Member 
State could make alternative offers of solidarity.165
The problems with relocation indeed go beyond the limited confines of possibly impacting upon 
the uptake and effectiveness of resettlement in the EU. The Czech Republic voiced the opinion that 
relocation involves substantial administrative and logistical burdens. Perhaps even more interesting 
than this though is the claim by t he Czechs that relocation is a potential risk of becoming a "pull 
 Solidarity with the country of first asylum must 
remain the clear priority for Member States. Financial support or special expertise might be offered in 
a show of intra-EU solidarity, which does not come at the price of resettlement places available.  
                                                     
161 Interviews with the various Swedish stakeholders. 
162 Interview with Swedish Ministry of Justice, op.cit. 
163 Interview with Janneke van Etten, op.cit. 
164 This conflict between solidarity priorities is touched upon in an MPC blog post, available here: 
http://debatemigration.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/between-solidarity-and-the-priority-to-protect-where-refugee-
relocation-meets-refugee-resettlement/ 
165 Interview with Andreas Ollinen, op.cit. 
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factor" for illegal migration.166 This allegation is made on the understanding that migrants may believe 
that upon reaching EU territory, they will get the opportunity of being relocated to a more desirable 
Member State, perhaps even the Member State of their choice. Romania and Lithuania voiced their 
belief that more needed to be done to ensure that the relocated refugees knew more about their 
destination pre-arrival. Lithuania considered the exercise to have been costly and ineffective.167 In 
October 2009 L ithuania refused to contribute to the EU initiative to relocate more asylum seekers 
from Malta168. However, in 2011, the Lithuanian Government decided to join the project, prepared by 
Malta and funded by the European Refugee Fund and committed to accept up to six asylum seekers.169
Another important concern of Member States which receive internationally protected persons 
through relocation is that the system of relocation will act as a disincentive to Member States to 
improve their national asylum systems. In other words, if refugees are relocated to Member State A 
because the reception conditions in Member State B are overwhelmed, then will Member State B look 
upon that relocation as being a temporary assistance or as a solution?  
  
As recently as the September of 2013, Commissioner Cecilia Malmström convened a ‘Relocation 
Forum’ to discuss the way forward for relocation and address any misgivings that Member States had 
about relocation. In the Commissioner’s address170 to the Forum, she stated that ‘Relocation is not a 
quick fix, it will not solve all the problems. It is one of many tools to alleviate and assist a Member 
State under pressure and in severe difficulties. Other types of assistance include funding, technical 
and human resources, training, contingency planning, EASO etc. Relocation is also not an alternative 
to get your house in order. It is however a true expression of solidarity and I do hope that many 
Member States can take part.’ The Commissioner thereby reinforced relocation as an act of solidarity 
in light of the fact that ‘five Member States take 70 % of all the asylum seekers,’ but importantly said 
that it is not an alternative to national asylum responsibility i.e. each Member State developing and 
maintaining their own functioning asylum system.171
                                                     
166 The Czech Republic ́s position on migration prepared by working group for a Parliament, to be announced to the EU 
Institutions, 5 June 2011. 
 The Commissioner did not address the 
relationship that has developed between relocation and resettlement. The Commissioner stated that she 
had taken the decision some months ago that there could be no C ommission proposal in the 
foreseeable future for a permanent legal mechanism for relocation – either voluntary or compulsory. 
The Commissioner thus allayed any Member States fears that relocation was about to become 
compulsory. The Commissioner stated that while EUREMA II, the second relocation scheme from 
Malta, was coming to an end, financial assistance would be available in the future for relocation 
through the Asylum and Migration Fund. ‘We understand that Member States don’t necessarily want 
EU project-managed relocation with rigid administrative requirements – that is why we will no longer 
have a EUREMA project, but instead we will have money available under the Asylum and Migration 
Fund for relocation activities that will be much easier to implement.’ Relocation shall continue to 
make an important contribution toward the provision of protection for refugees in the EU.  
167 European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for a 
Relocation of Beneficiaries of International protection JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005, Final Report 2010, available on t he 
internet: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/asylum/docs/final_report_relocation_of_refugees.pdf 
168 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, Legal information: In the Meeting of Ministers of the Interior of 
Lithuania and Malta Issues of Granting Asylum for Asylum Seekers in European Union were discussed, 28th October 
2009, available on the internet: http://www.vrm.lt/index.php?id=131&backPID=129&begin_at=720&tt_news=2281& 
169 Resolution on asylum seekers from the Republic of Malta, No 1082, 14th of September 2011, available on the internet: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=406687&p_query=&p_tr2=2 
170 The Commissioner’s full address is available here: http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/refugeerelocation/ 
171 The Commissioner quoted the statistic in her blog post, available at: 
http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/refugeerelocation/ 
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In the absence of clear and cohesive guidance as to how to approach relocation so as not to impact 
upon resettlement, it is left to Member States to implement these distinct terms in a way which seeks 
to place protection for the most vulnerable at the heart of all measures. Relocated refugees should not 
be counted as part of a Member State’s resettlement quota. Relocation should only be encouraged 
secondary to resettlement. Funding should prioritise resettlement above relocation. The Hague 
Programme, referred to earlier in this report, called for a spirit of shared responsibility to a more 
accessible, equitable and effective international protection system. It seems that resettlement best 
satisfies these objectives as its primary concern is to provide protection while the priority of relocation 
is to express intra-EU solidarity. Resettlement is also an expression of solidarity but this solidarity is 
with countries of first asylum. Countries of first asylum, beyond the territory of the EU, play host to 
much larger numbers and are under a greater strain than any Member State.  
Resettlement can also be used to support the EU’s Regional Protection Programmes. Sweden was 
one Member State which stated that solidarity with countries of first asylum must take preference over 
southern Member States that have the same responsibilities to protect as Sweden. Resettlement 
undoubtedly remains the preferable response to those most in need. The priority to protect those who 
have not been able to gain access to European territory should remain the primary objective. Providing 
such access negates the need for people to become irregular migrants during their journey to Europe, 
the journey that many refugees who are relocated have been forced to undergo. Intra-Member State 
solidarity, while an understandable objective in its own right, must not come at the expense of 
protecting those most in need. Relocation then, must only come as a co mplement rather than as a 
replacement to the numbers who are being resettled. Clarifying the important difference between the 
two schemes must be an important objective into the future. As Commissioner Cecilia Malmström has 
outlined plans to incentivise relocation through funding in September of 2013, it seems certain that 
relocation will continue as an option for Member States. This means that oversight of the different 
problems outlined here must be considered by Member States and the EU so as to impact upon 
resettlement as little as possible. 
5. Conclusion 
The development of resettlement-related frameworks and policies in the EU and its Member States is 
undeniable and has accelerated during the past five years. This is mainly due to the combined effect of 
joint operations to respond to major refugee crises and to the EU’s increased support to UNHCR 
efforts to encourage States to begin to resettle refugees. EU led initiatives for multilateral operations 
has been the main incentive for Member States to get involved in refugee resettlement which have no 
history in resettlement. 
A small majority (fourteen) of Member States are now resettlement countries, insofar as they have 
committed to resettling refugees on a programme basis. Moreover, while refugee resettlement depends 
on voluntary governmental decision, exclusive from any legal duty, it is not only based on an 
administrative framework any longer. Refugee resettlement is growingly based on asylum and refugee 
law. A quasi majority of Member States (thirteen) have included a reference to refugee resettlement in 
their asylum legislation, eleven of them did so during the past decade. This does not make resettlement 
a legal duty for those States, nor a right for refugees. Yet, the adaptation of legal frameworks may 
facilitate refugee resettlement. This may be the case by allowing the granting of refugee status outside 
the territory for instance, or designing the procedure and determining the competent institutions. 
The absence of legal reference to refugee resettlement has not impeded certain Member States from 
resettling in the past (in Scandinavia) and still currently (in the Netherlands) in a sustainable and 
regular manner. Equally, the existence of a legal reference to refugee resettlement is not a guarantee 
that the State does or will resettle. It does not constitute an evidence of but can help and support 
sustainable commitment.  
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It has now become easier than in the past to legislate on refugee resettlement, since a set of 
practices and experiences have been developed. Most of all, the UNHCR has published some 
handbooks to guide the selection of refugees, the resettlement process and procedures as well as the 
granting of status and rights and the integration of resettled refugees. The EU has come to give support 
to UNHCR guidelines in prioritising and funding resettlement activities when they follow UNHCR 
standards, such as the selection of refugees falling into some of UNHCR submission categories or the 
granting of a status similar to refugee status. Despite those efforts to standardize and streamline 
refugee resettlement, the diversity in the content of resettlement-related frameworks and policies 
among Member States is still striking. Even basic standards of refugee resettlement such as t he 
UNHCR mandate and its role in pre-selecting vulnerable refugees, or the granting of permanent 
residence are not shared by the majority of legal references to refugee resettlement. 
The Joint EU Resettlement Programme has been a g reat support to the development of 
commitments in resettlement and plays an important role in the search for a concerted approach to 
resettlement. Indeed, through requirements for the funding, it influences the selection targets of 
Member States as well as the procedure and the rights granted. Nevertheless, its impact is limited. It is 
based on a financial incentive which does not convince all Member States, and on the positive impact 
of joint initiatives. The JEURP could go further, as could the EU. 
The overlap between resettlement and relocation has been a n egative development in respect of 
both of those distinct procedures. The evolution of resettlement in the EU has become susceptible to 
the strategic use of relocation by Member States as the ‘soft’ option when it is under pressure to stand 
up to its responsibility as an EU partner. Relocation can be more attractive to Member States and can 
be preferable to the challenge of resettlement. It is perhaps this conflict in terms which, more than 
anything else, has highlighted the need for strong central governance of how resettlement is handled 
by the Member States. Relocation, if it is to succeed must complement resettlement and not replace it.  
The lack of reporting of refugee resettlement in independent news and media is an obstacle to 
improving resettlement in quantitative and qualitative terms. Apart from the media, resettlement can 
be promoted and publicised as being a public issue to be discussed by all of those which have a stake 
in resettlement – policymakers, NGOs, migration authorities, lawyers and refugees themselves. All 
stakeholders state that resettlement is not openly discussed and that the majority of society are simply 
not aware of it despite the fact that ‘it is an issue that can be explained and advanced among the 
population very easily.’172 It may be difficult to convince policy makers for a structural commitment 
since not everybody knows about resettlement, including among policy makers.173
‘In the Swedish context, it is very important that politicians are not afraid to stand up for refugees. 
They dare saying that it is an important issue and that Sweden needs to show solidarity. Moreover, 
the Minister of migration always mentions resettlement when he talks about asylum issues. Often, 
at the EU-level, Sweden stands out as the odd country proposing to improve asylum policy, to 
receive more refugees etc. This positive approach is considered peculiar by the other Member 
States. The Member States often have to deal with negative public opinion and politicians/parties 
that are unreceptive towards the asylum issue.’
 A heightened 
public understanding of resettlement would assist greatly in improving how resettlement is conducted 
in all Member States.  
174
‘In the context of growing anti-immigration atmosphere, the influence of the media would be to 
make the public opinion understand why we need to protect refugees. The key factors are to be 
found in a public discourse more open to foreigners and refugees.’
 
175
                                                     
172 Interview with the Swedish Justice Ministry, op.cit. 
 
173 Ewout Adriaens, Know Reset Final Conference, Brussels, 10 July 2013. 
174 Interview with the Swedish Justice Ministry, op.cit. 
175 Interview with Matthieu Tardis, op.cit. 
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5.1 Recommendations 
− The EU should fund and prioritize all UNHCR submission categories and not only five of 
them. 
− Geographic priorities should be defined on a m ore flexible basis, be easily revised and 
extended when new refugee crises, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, occur. 
− The EU should seek to make an impact on Member State resettlement laws and policies not 
only through funding and rallying, but also through its own legislating.  
− A legal framework for resettlement is needed in all of the Member States. 
− Even if Member States want to keep resettlement voluntary, an EU Directive could 
standardize some basic and fundamental elements of refugee resettlement, such as: 
• Resettlement shall aim at receiving vulnerable refugees on the basis of UNHCR 
submission categories, and should not include integration pre-considerations, 
• The persons to be resettled should not necessarily meet the Geneva Convention 
definition. A common definition of refugee could be adopted on t he basis of the 
Mandate refugee definition. 
• Resettlement should be carried out in cooperation with UNHCR. 
• Resettled refugees should be granted a permanent residence status. 
• Resettled refugees should be granted rights similar to those granted with Convention 
refugee status. 
• Resettled refugees should not be submitted to an additional application process upon 
arrival or only as an option to gain more rights. 
− Refugee Resettlement could be incorporated in the broad protection system. It should be 
linked to and based on a number of minimum requirements. 
− An EU Resettlement System should be developed on the model of the Common European 
Asylum System. 
− The distinction should be made and promoted by the EU between contributing toward 
refugee protection internally (relocation) and externally (resettlement). The emphasis in 
financial terms should be on resettlement. 
− Being an Agency which has a responsibility for monitoring both relocation and resettlement 
within the EU, EASO should be fully utilised as a monitor but also to give assistance as far 
as this is possible. 
− The EU should contribute to raising awareness and generating public support to refugee 
resettlement and refugee reception as a whole through media campaigns and the diffusion of 
information. Awareness-raising towards policy-makers will also facilitate the commitment of 
Member States in resettlement programmes. 
− The EU should favour more cost-effectiveness and efficiency as a result of economies of 
scale in resettlement. In particular, joint resettlement selection missions should be promoted. 
In addition to reducing costs and organisational constraints, it would lower refugees’ waiting 
time and interviews.  
− The EU should continue to encourage twinning arrangements and projects favouring 
knowledge and information exchange with regard to refugee resettlement, as well as the 
exchange of practices and sharing guidelines (on the model of the Temporary Desk on Iraq), 
in particular when it comes to reception and integration.  
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Annexes 




Formal Basis for Resettlement Date of resettlement 
Specific provision in Law Governmental Act Ad Hoc Resettlement Programme based Resettlement 
Austria None None 2011 None 
Belgium 
None *Decision of the Council of Ministers on a 
specific resettlement – Iraqi and 
Palestinians from refugee camps in Syria 
and Jordan (2009) 
 
*Decision of the Cabinet on a specific 

















None *Council of Ministers draft decision 
(2012) - Pilot programme  
None  
 
Planned for 2014 
Cyprus None  None None None 
Czech 
Republic 
Asylum Act (1999), Section 90  
 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
resettlement – Burmese (2008) 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
resettlement – Burmese (2009) 
 
*Government Resolution on a specific 
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Denmark 
 
Aliens Act (2011), as amended in 
2005, Section 8 
None None Since 1978 
Estonia None None None None 
Finland 
 
Aliens Act (2004), Section 90, 91, 92. 
 
 
*Decision on the geographical allocation 
of the refugee quota, 17 February 2012 







*Framework Agreement between France 
and the UNHCR (2008) 
Since 1948 












Residence Act (2004), Section 22.  
*Ruling of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior about Iraqi refugees (2008) 
 
*Decision on the launch of a permanent 
resettlement programme and on 















Greece None None None None 
Hungary 
Asylum Act (2007), Section 7  
*Governmental Decree (2011) Refugee 
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Latvia None None None None 
Lithuania None None None None 
Luxembourg None None 2009 None 
Malta None None None None 
Netherlands 
None  
*Decree (2000) transfers responsibility 
for the quota policy for resettled refugees 
to the Minister of Justice 
 
*Decree of the Minister of Justice (2010) 
outlines Dutch resettlement policy 
 
*Government Decision (2012) Policy 
Framework for Resettlement (2012-2015) 
None Since 1984 
 
Poland 
Act on granting protection to 










Asylum Law (2008), Chapter III 
Section V  
 
*Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
(2007)  




Refugee Act (1996), Section 24.  
*Cabinet Decision (1998) – Quota 
decision 







Law on Asylum (2006), Article 3(5)  
*Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 
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*Decision on the Resettlement of Refugees 
(2008) – Sets out regulation of 
resettlement and states how many 
refugees will be resettled during the 
period 2008-2010  
 
*2012 Decision to amend the 2008 










Planned for 2012-2013 
Slovakia 
 
None *Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 
(2009): Emergency Transit Centre in 
Humenné 
 
*Agreement with UNHCR and IOM 




International Protection Act (2007), 
Chapter VIII Section 70 
 
*Government Decree on implementation 








Law regulating the right to asylum 
and subsidiary protection (2009) 
 
 
*Royal Decree (1995) – makes reference 
to UNHCR requests to resettle 
 
 
*Decision of the Council of Ministers 
(2010) – Approves the 2010 programme: 
75 refugees 
 
*Decision of the Council of Ministers 
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*Communication of the Council of 





Planned for 2013-2014 
Sweden 
Aliens Act (2005), Chapter 5 Section 2  
*Spending authorization for the Migration 
Board (2011) –by the Ministry of Justice, 
defines the resettlement quota for 2012 
 
*Migration Board Decision on 
Resettlement (2012) - Distribution of 
places, strategic and operational 
assessments 
None Since 1950 
United 
Kingdom 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act (2002), Section 59 
None None  
 
Since 2004 
 13 EU countries refer to resettlement in Law. 
15 EU countries have adopted 
government acts related to 
resettlement. 
10 EU countries have 
resettled on an ad hoc 
basis. 
14 EU countries have 
resettled on a 
programme basis. 
 18 EU countries have had a formal basis for resettlement. 16 EU countries have already resettled. 
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Annex 2. Pre-Arrival and Post-Arrival Phases of Refugee Resettlement in the EU Member States 
i. Pre- arrival phase  






EU countries  





Dossiers Missions Actors involved 
Before 
arrival 
Upon arrival Cultural orientation 
1 Austria No 2011: Christian Iraqis  Selected by 
representatives 





-Ministry of the 
Interior 
Yes  n/a 
2 Belgium  No  
(2009, 2011) 
2011: Family with 
children and single 
women.  
 

















2011: CO not provided. 
Information pamphlets 
covering information 
about Belgium were 
printed but not given to 
refugees.  
                                                     
176
 Yes: The State accepts obligations towards refugees recognised by UNHCR according to a broader definition – Mandate Refugee Status – No: Geneva Convention criteria and generally 
Subsidiary Protection criteria.  
48 KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
Delphine Perrin - Frank McNamara
3 Bulgaria  Yes (possible) Bulgaria is interested 
in resettling 
Afghani and Iraqi 
refugees from 
Turkey.  
/  /  -UNHCR 
-State Agency for 
Refugees 
/  /  /  






persons: seriously ill 
persons, children, 
women at risk and 




aspects are also taken 
into consideration.  











Done by the Resettlement 
Group when interviewing 
the people in need of 
resettlement in the country 
of first asylum –initial 
information about what 
they can expect from 
resettlement in the Czech 
Republic and to what 
extent they will receive 
assistance on arrival. 
6 Denmark  No  Sub-quotas: 75 urgent 
cases; “Twenty-Or-
More” for specially 
sick or handicapped 
refugees.  
Integration criteria 
included in 2005.  
Supplementary criteria 
of influence: language 
qualifications, 







Yes  -UNHCR  
-Danish 
Immigration 




Yes  Yes done by DIS and 
Danish language teachers. 
Offered to all refugees 
accepted on selection 
missions but not to 
refugees on dossier basis. 
Over one week. 
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7 Estonia / / / / / / / / 




allocation of the 
quota, based on the 
need of continuity in 
the chosen  
refugee groups.  
 
Capacity to integrate is 
a factor. 
10% of the quota are 
reserved for 
emergency cases and 













Yes  Cultural orientation is the 
remit of IOM. The 
arrangement was 
established in 2001 and ran 
until the termination of the 
contract in 2010.  
 
The co was not arranged in 
2011 and the contract is 
currently being negotiated. 
Currently no c ultural 
orientation is organized. 
9 France Yes  
 
2008 (Iraq 500):  
Belonging to a 
religious minority 
(especially Christian) 
and link with France 
(either through family 
ties or knowledge of 
French by at least one 
family member). 
Residence either in 
Iraq or in a 
neighbouring country: 
Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon or Turkey. 
 
 




Pre-Selection Yes Sessions of cultural 
introduction can be 
organised by IOM. This 
has been done only for 
Iraqis and EU relocation.  
When such activities 
cannot be organised, the 
IOM may distribute an 
information package, of 
which the Information 
Leaflet for People 
Resettled in France. 
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consideration of the 
reception and housing 
capacity in the 
country. 
 
10 Germany Yes  2008: Focus on 
members of 
persecuted (religious) 
minorities, victims of 
violence and with 
special medical needs, 
single women with 
children.  
Other criteria such as 
capacity of 
integration, ties with 
Germany and family 
unity.  
 
2011: Priority to 
refugees with Sub-
Saharan origin who 
fled from Libya. 
Pre-
Selection 
Yes  -UNHCR  
-BAMF 
 Yes No 
11 Greece / / / / / / / / 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 51
Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames
12 Hungary No No specific 
admissibility criteria. 
A family (5-8 persons) 
from the North-
African region. 
Aspects to consider 
when doing 






/ Yes -UNHCR  
-OIN 
 
 Yes No  
13 Ireland Yes Preference 
-Group resettlement 
-“balanced” caseload 



















Yes  Yes 
Through the Irish 
authorities 




Yes No, except in 












15 Latvia / / / / / / / / 
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16 Lithuania / / / / / / / / 
17 Luxembourg No 2009: Families with 










Yes  OLAI did prepare some 
leaflets concerning rights 
upon arrival, including 
healthcare and education 
18 Malta / / / / / / / / 
19 Netherlands No Subquota: 30 Medical 
cases. 
Refugees with medical 
needs and women at 




More emphasis will be 
placed on the 
Integration potential 
which has been 
applied since 2005.  




be used as 
strategically as 
possible with regard to 































- Central Agency 
Yes No Organised by COA, 
consisting of three 
trainings. Content: 
elementary Dutch language 
skill; Information about the 
Dutch society; Information 
about the receiving 
municipality; and the 
future accommodation. 
For dossier-based refugees, 
CO trainings are developed 
and offered by IOM in 
cooperation with COA. 
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migration policy and 
UNHCR to select 
more higher profile 
refugees such as 






20 Poland n/a Humanitarian aspects, 
necessity to satisfy the 
essential needs of 
resettled refugees, 





n/a In the future: 
Interview by 









-Head of the 
Office for 
Foreigners via 




Yes Yes n/a 
21 Portugal Yes Programme: 
Continuity in 
resettlement;  
Privilege to citizens 
coming from the 
African continent and 
from Eastern Europe, 
but not excluding 
other situations of 
citizens coming from 
other places, if these 
justify their priority 




















Yes  Non systematic distribution 
of a “Cultural 
Orientation Leaflet for 
Resettled Refugees in 
Portugal”. 
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2011: People from 




minors, children and 
women at risk. 
22 Romania No 
 
Potential for 
integration applied in 
2008, dropped in 2012. 
2012 Criteria: Express 
consent of the refugee 




requirements at EU 
level. 
Minimum medical 
















Pre-Selection Yes Yes 
Romanian NGOs involved 
in integration programmes 
will participate to the 
selection missions to 
inform refugees on 
integration activities in 
Romania and prepare 
integration programmes. 
In addition, possible 
cultural orientation and 
counselling services 
provided by ROI. 
23 Slovakia / / / / / / / / 
24 Slovenia n/a Global migration 
trends, crisis areas 
around the world, 
integration capacities. 




Yes  Yes 
Informative lecture  -  
general information on 
Slovenia, cultural 
characteristics and habits, 
on the prohibition of 
polygamy and gender 
equality, rights and 
obligations of persons 
enjoying international 
protection in Slovenia. 
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25 Spain Yes (possible) The criteria will be 
defined on yearly 
basis.  






2012 (Tunisia)  
-UNHCR  
-OAR (Office of 
Asylum and 
Refugees) 
Yes  Yes (2011) 
By IOM – Information 
sessions about Spain  
26 Sweden Yes No additional criteria. 
Number of places by 
country of first asylum 
decided annually.  
350 places for urgent 






Yes, for less 




Yes Possible Yes (Migration Board 
Officers) 
For more than half of the 
refugees selected for 
resettlement, mainly those 
selected via in country 
selection missions. 
Generally, cultural 




Yes Regional allocation 
targets, including 
RPP. 
Small percentage for 
medical cases and a 
higher percentage for 
women-at-risk. 
For Mandate refugees: 
integration potential 
and links with the UK. 




- Refugee Team 




Yes No By UK mission staff to 
refugees explaining the 
travel, reception and initial 
integration arrangements. 
Previously by IOM.  
Since 2011, a  1 day 
programme has been 
delivered by staff from the 
Refugee Resettlement Unit 
at the UKBA. It includes 
video interviews with 
refugees previously 
resettled through the 
programme in which they 
talk about their experiences 
of resettling and advice for 
new arrivals. 
56 KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
Delphine Perrin - Frank McNamara
II-Post- arrival phase 




EU countries  





status or other 
Specific status 
The same as national citizens 
The same as 
refugees 
The same as persons 
under the subsidiary 
protection status 
Other specific rights under 
national law 
1 Austria X    X   
2 Belgium  X    X for health care and social 






  Right of permanent 
residence. 
3 Bulgaria  X   Potential to become 
naturalized at a later phase 
 
X    
4 Cyprus / / / / / / / 




  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Citizenship may be granted 
on request after 5 years of 






6 Denmark  X X   X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 








X  4 year- residence permit  
7 Estonia / / / / / / / 
KNOW RESET RR 2013/03 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 57
Refugee Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames
8 Finland    X (Quota Refugees) X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment, after the 
‘integration period’. 




 4 year-residence permit 
Direct access to 
immigrants’ benefits upon 
arrival 
9 France X 
 
X  X for health care, social 
welfare and housing, access to 





(1 year-stay permit) 
 
10 Germany   X X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
  3 year-stay permit. After 7 
years a settlement permit 
can be granted. 
Strict conditions for 
family reunification.  
11 Greece / / / / / / / 
12 Hungary X / / / X / / 
13 Ireland    X (Programme 
Refugees) 
X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 3 
years – to be extended to 5 
years by future reform. 
X 
 
 Facilities for family 
reunification 




 X for health care and social 






(3-year stay permit) 
 
15 Latvia / / / / / / / 
16 Lithuania / / / / / / / 
17 Luxembourg X   X Social welfare and 
healthcare 
X   
18 Malta        
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19 Netherlands   
 
 X (Invited Refugees) X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 5 






 5 year residence permit.  
20 Poland X X   X X  
21 Portugal X X  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 






(2 year-stay permit) 
 
22 Romania X   X for health care, access to 
education and employment. 
X   
23 Slovakia / / / / / / / 
24 Slovenia X   X for health and social care, 
access to education and 
employment. 
X  Right to permanent 
residence 




 X for health care and social 






(1 year-stay permit) 
 
26 Sweden X X  X for health care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 
Access to citizenship after 4 
years for refugees, after 5 










x   X for medical care and social 
welfare, access to education 
and employment. 




 Indefinite Leave to 
Remain 
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Austria No No / / 
Belgium Yes No / / 







Republic Yes No / Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes / / 
Estonia No No / / 
Finland Yes No / No 
France Yes Yes / Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Yes  
Seems to merge both 
data within resettlement. 








Hungary Yes Yes / / 






Latvia No No / / 
Lithuania No Yes    / / 












Netherlands Yes Yes / 
Usually Yes (but used 
its resettlement quota 
for a emergency 
relocation in 2006) 
Poland Yes (in theory) Yes (in theory) 
Yes 
Same legal basis, same 
quota 
/ 
Portugal Yes Yes / / 
Romania Yes Yes / No 
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Slovakia Yes (in theory) Yes (in theory) Yes (terminology) Yes 
Slovenia Yes (in theory) Yes 
Yes 
Same legal basis, same 
quota  
/ 
Spain Yes Yes / / 






Totals: 20 Yes 15 Yes 5 Yes 5 Yes 
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